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NOTES
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT-FINDING MIDDLE GROUND
BETWEEN OPPORTUNITY AND OPPORTUNISM: THE "ORIGINAL
SOURCE" PROVISION OF 31 U.S.c. § 3730(e)(4)
INTRODUCTION
The Civil False Claims Act! was originally enacted during the
Civil War when fraud, price gouging, and deliveries of defective
weapons plagued the Union Anny.2 Under the False Claims Act
("Act" or "False Claims Act"), a private citizen, acting on behalf of
the United States, can bring suit against someone who has allegedly
defrauded the government, earning a portion of the recovery if the
suit is successful.3 Throughout its 130 year history, the False Claims
Act has been viewed by some commentators as an opportunity for
the recovery of lost revenue, the weapon of vigilant taxpayers who
file suit attempting to recoup losses for their defrauded govern
ment, a deterrent against unlawful activity, and a means of supple
menting the federal treasury.4 Others have seen the False Claims
Act as a vehicle for opportunistic plaintiffs, whose suits both actu
ally reduce the amount of federal recovery from unscrupulous con
tractors and interfere with the federal government's efforts to
1. 31 u.s.c. §§ 3729-3733 (1988).
2. JOHN T. BOESE, CNIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM AcnONS, 1-3 (1993).
3. 31 u.s.c. § 3730(b), (d).
4.
Since ... amendments [were] enacted in 1986 which revived the act, the
[False Oaims Act] has brought $588 million back into the Treasury. The Gov
ernment now recovers more money through these whistle-blower lawsuits
than through suits initiated by the Justice Department. Not surprisingly, De
fense contractors hate the whistle-blower law.... These same companies have
paid out more than a half-billion dollars in penalties and settlements for fraud
in just the past 3 fiscal years - a quarter of which comes from whistleblower
lawsuits alone.
140 CoNG. REc. S1915-01 (daily ed. Feb. 25,1994) (statement of Sen. Grassley, sponsor
of the 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act). See James B. Helmer, Jr. & Robert
Clark Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims
Act, the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act and Their Application in the United
States ex reL Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation, 18 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 35, 72,
74-75 (1991) [hereinafter War Stories].
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curtail fraud. 5
These two conflicting views are reflected in a current split
among the United States courts of appeals over the proper interpre
tation of one component of the Act's jurisdictional requirements:
the "original source" provision in section 3730(e)(4), which covers
subject matter jurisdiction of private plaintiff suits under the Act. 6
This section of the Act is implicated where a private plaintiff's suit,
brought on behalf of the government, is based upon allegations and
transactioris that have been publicly disclosed.? The private plain
tiff is barred from maintaining such a suit unless she can show that
she is an original source as defined in the statute, i.e., has direct and
independent knowledge of the information that forms the basis for
her suit. 8 Some courts of appeals have construed the statute
broadly to allow plaintiffs to bring an action whenever they can
show some direct and independent knowledge of the information
that has been publicly disclosed. 9 Other courts of appeals have con
5.
"You can't have private citizens running around as bounty hunters after
corporations . . . . Thming that power over to any Tom, Dick or Harry is a
very unfair way to proceed. That's no way to run the government." ... [I]t
destroys business relationships and further diminishes [the Pentagon's] diluted
authority.
Ralph Vartabedian, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1993 at Al (quoting former United States
Attorney General William Barr). See Michael Lawrence Kolis, Comment, Settling for
Less: The Department of Justice's Command Performance Under the 1986 False Claims
Amendments Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 409 (1993); Francis E. Purcell, Jr., Comment,
Qui Tam Suits Under the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986: The Need for Clear
Legislative Expression, 42 CA1H. U. L. REv. 935, 948 (1993).
6. § 3730(e)(4)(A), (B). The original source provision of § 3730(e)(4) bars a pri
vate plaintiff from bringing suit under the Act where information that forms the basis of
the suit is in the public domain, unless the plaintiff is an original source of the informa
tion. [d. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text for a full definition of the origi
nal source provision; see also part II, infra, for a discussion of the split in the courts of
appeals.
7. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
8. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
9. See Cooper ex reL United States v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc., 19 F.3d
562,567 (11th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff allowed to bring suit where, despite public disclosure
of information in suit, plaintiff had direct knowledge obtained independently); United
States ex reL Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1347-49 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994) (plaintiff allowed to maintain suit despite public disclosure
if knowledge of transactions and allegations is direct and independent); United States
ex rei. Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 651-53 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (informa
tion gleaned from discovery in prior suit insufficient to indicate fraud; plaintiffs addi
tional knowledge of defendant's activities and subsequent interviews gave it direct and
independent information); United States ex rel Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971
F.2d 548, 553 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1364 (1993) (plaintiff allowed to
maintain suit only where knowledge is direct and independent); United States ex rei.
Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1991) ("original source"
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strued the provision narrowly to prohibit such suits by plaintiffs,
fearing that plaintiffs whose information is not wholly original are
seeking only to capitalize on information that has already been pub
licly disclosed. These courts have required a private plaintiff to be a
"whistle-blower," the individual responsible for any public disclo
sure, in order to maintain her suit. 10 Although the split among the
United States courts of appeals reflects divergent policy goals, the
key to understanding these two different approaches lies in the
method of statutory construction used in interpreting this critical
provision: the interpretation of the plain language of the Act and
the weight and meaning to be accorded to the Act's extensive and
complex legislative history as evidence of congressional intent and
purpose.
This Note addresses the jurisdictional requirements expressed
in section 3730(e)( 4) of the Act,11 specifically the "original source"
provisions that bar a private plaintiff from maintaining a suit under
the Act where information that forms the basis of her suit has been
publicly disclosed. Part I presents the historical background and
legislative history of this oft-amended Act, including a review of the
language of section 3730(e)(4). Part II traces the development of
two branches of thought in the federal courts concerning the appli
cation of the jurisdictional bar to suits under the Act. Part III re
views principles of statutory construction and the legislative history
of the Act to conclude that the criteria for subject matter jurisdic
tion in the statute are sufficient to protect against parasitic suits
under the False Claims Act without requiring that the plaintiff in
such suits be the individual responsible for any public disclosure.
requires direct and independent knowledge); United States ex rei. Houck v. Folding
Carton Admin. Comm., 881 F.2d 494, 504 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026,
and cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 0990) (direct and independent knowledge required of
an "original source"); United States ex reL Stinson v. Provident Life & Accident Ins.
Co., 721 F. Supp. 1247, 1257 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (plaintiff with direct and independent
knowledge of the fraudulent practices is not barred from bringing suit). See infra part
II.B for a discussion of the courts of appeals which use "direct and independent" as the
standard for detennining "original source" under § 3730(e)(4).
10. See Wang ex reL United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1418 (9th Cir.
1992) (jurisdiction under False Claims Act is only appropriate for those who have been
instrumental in the public disclosure of allegations of fraud); United States ex rei. Dick
v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1990) (plaintiff must have directly
or indirectly been a source to the entity that publicly disclosed· the allegations); United
States ex rei. Fine v. MK Ferguson Co., 861 F. Supp. 1544 (D.N.M. 1994) (adopting
reasoning of Second and Ninth Circuits). See infra part II.A for a discussion of the
"whistle-blower" requirement imposed by these circuits on the "original source" provi
sion of § 3730(e)(4).
11. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A), (B).
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BACKGROUND

Legislative History12
1.

The False Claims Act of 1863

The False Claims Act 13 was originally enacted in 1863 in re
sponse to congressional outrage over fraud committed by unscrupu
lous contractors against the War Department during the Civil
War. 14 The Act, known at the time as the "Lincoln Law,"15 pro
vided civil and criminal penalties for individuals convicted of know
ingly submitting false claims to the government. 16 Concerned that
the federal government would be unable to uncover all instances of
fraud, Congress established a cause of action for private individuals
with knowledge of fraudulent acts,17 This cause of action, known as
a qui tam suit,18 authorized private plaintiffs to bring suit on behalf
12. The legislative history of the False Claims Act from 1863-1986 has been
comprehensively recorded. For an early thorough analysis in case law, see United
States ex reL LaValley v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 707 F. Supp. 1351, 1354-56 (D.
Mass. 1988). The most detailed history appears in War Stories, supra note 4, at 35-47.
For additional full recitations of this lengthy history, see also BOESE, supra note 2;
Kolis, supra note 5, at 413-20.
13. 31 U.S.c. §§ 3729-33.
14. BOESE, supra note 2, at 1-5. Unscrupulous contractors were becoming "'pro
verbially and notoriously rich.'" United States ex reL Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles
and Space Co., Inc., 722 F. Supp. 607,609 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (quoting 1 F. SHANNON, THE
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNION ARMY, 1861-1865, 54-56 (1965)
(citation omitted».
For sugar [the government] often got sand; for coffee, rye; for leather, some
thing no better than brown paper; for sound horses and mules, spavined beasts
and dying donkeys; and for serviceable muskets and pistols, the experimental
failures of sanguine inventors, or the refuse of shops and foreign armories.
Id. (quoting SHANNON, supra, at 58 (citation omitted».
15. BOESE, supra note 2, at 1-3.
16. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENT Acr OF
1986, S. REp. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266,5267, and in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS Acr
OF 1986, § 2 at 8 [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
17. S. REp. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,5267, and in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, § 2 at 10.
18. The term "qui tam" comes from the Latin phrase, "qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur," which translates as "who brings the action for
the king as well as for himself." Erickson ex reL United States v. American Inst. of
Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 909 n.l (E.D. Va. 1989) (quoting W. BLACKSTONE,
CoMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 160 (1768». "A qui tam action is one in
which the plaintiff sues for himself and on behalf of the government to recover a pen
alty under a statute which provides that part of the penalty is awarded to the party
bringing the suit and the remainder of the penalty is awarded to the government."
United States ex rei. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1102 n.1 (7th Cir. 1984). A qui
tam provision enables parties who are not directly injured, and therefore would other
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of the United States to recover money acquired through "false
claims" which had been submitted to the government,19 As an in
centive, the private plaintiffs, called "relators,"2o were offered the
chance to recover half of the damages and forfeitures collected,
plus costs, if the litigation proved successfu1. 21
2.

The 1943 Amendments: Congressional Reaction to
United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess 22

In the years following its enactment, the Act was seldom uti
lized. During the 1930s and 1940s, however, increased government
spending brought new opportunities for unscrupulous contractors
to collect fraudulent profits.23 The original provisions of the Act
did not restrict the ability of private plaintiffs to bring a qui tam suit
even where the suits were based on publicly disclosed informa
tion.24 As a result, a series of "parasitic" civil suits were brought by
opportunistic plaintiffs, in which the allegations in the qui tam suit
were actually derived from previously issued criminal indictments
by the government,25 In the most famous of these cases, United
States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess,26 electrical contractors, who were em
ployed to work on Public Works Administration projects near Pitts
burgh, were indicted for defrauding the government, pled nolo
contendere, and were fined $54,000.27 Subsequent to that criminal
action, a qui tam plaintiff brought a civil action under the Act
wise lack standing to bring the suit, to sue on behalf of the Government. BOESE, supra
note 2, at 1-4.
19. BOESE, supra note 2, at 1-3 to 1-4.
20. S. REp. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5275.
21. Id. Although used originally to combat fraud in the defense industry, the
False Claims Act has recently been useful in prosecuting health care fraud. See David
J. Ryan, The False Claims Act: An Old Weapon with New Firepower Is Aimed at Health
Care Fraud, 4 ANN. OF HEALTH LAW 127 (1995).
22. 317 U.S. 537 (1943). See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
23. BOESE, supra note 2, at 1-10.
24. Id. The relevant portion of the Act at the time of the decision in Hess read as
follows: "Such suit may be brought and carried on by any person, as well as for himself
as for the United States ...." Act of March 2, 1863, Ch. 67, § 4, 12 Stat. 698 (1863)
(codified as amended 31 U.S.c. § 232 (1943) and recodified as amended 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729-3731 (1986» (punishment of fraud upon the federal government).
25. See, e.g., United States ex rei. Ostrager v. New Orleans Chap. Associated
Gen. Contractors, Inc., 317 U.S. 562 (1943) (qui tam plaintiff had standing to sue on
behalf of the United States where claim was based upon previous criminal indictments);
see also S. REp. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5275; BOESE, supra note 2, at 1-11.
26. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
27. Id. at 539, 545.
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against the contractors that resulted in a judgment of $315,000. 28
Despite arguments by the government that the suit should not be
allowed, the United States Supreme Court in Hess held that the
False Claims Act did not bar a qui tam suit where the complainant
might have obtained his information from a previous indictment,29
Significantly, the Court refused to read restrictions into the plain
language of the statute and instead offered to Congress the oppor
tunity to provide "specifically for the amount of new information
which the informer must produce to be entitled to reward."30
Reaction to the Court's decision in Hess was swift. In the next
session of Congress, Attorney General Francis Biddle requested
that Congress repeal the entire qui tam provision. 31 The House of
Representatives followed his direction. 32 The Senate, however, was
reluctant to eliminate the provision altogether, citing fears of gov
ernmental delay and inadequate enforcement if the qui tam provi
sion were totally repealed.33 The final amendment reflected a
compromise between the two camps:34 the Act, after the 1943
amendments, retained the qui tam provision, but barred relators
from bringing actions that were "based on evidence or information
the government had when the action was brought."35
This restriction on actions by qui tam plaintiffs had effects
which had not been anticipated by the legislature. 36 As a result of
28. [d. at 539-40.
29. [d. at 545.
30. [d. at 546 & n.9.
31. S. REp. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.AN. at 5276.
32. [d.
33. [d.
34. An exception present in the original Senate version of the bill, which would
have allowed a qui tam plaintiff to bring an action if the information on which the suit
was based was "original" with such person, was dropped in conference from the final
version. S. REp. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. 5266,
5277.
35. 31 U.S.c. § 3730(b)(4) (1982) (superseded). After the 1943 amendments, the
language of this section read as follows: "(4) Unless the Government proceeds with the
action, the court shall dismiss an action brought by the person on discovering the action
is based on evidence or information the Government had when the action was
brought." [d.
36. The language of the floor debate reveals that Congress assumed many qui tam
actions could still be maintained after the passage of the 1943 Amendments. Senator
Van Nuys, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated his belief that "the pro
posal 'protects the honest informer as nearly we can do it by statute (and) ... would not
prevent an honest informer from coming in.''' S. REp. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1986) (quoting 89 CoNG. REe. 7609 (1943)), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. 5266, 5277
(alterations in the original). Representative Kefauver commented, "[If] the average,
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the passage of the 1943 amendments, a qui tam plaintiff who was
jurisdictionally barred from bringing a suit not only lost the oppor
tunity to recover a portion of the award, but also was precluded
from objecting to settlements or dismissals of the suit and from
challenging any lack of diligence on the part of the investigating
governmental agency.37 Further, the jurisdictional bar was held by
the courts to preclude a suit by a qui tam plaintiff even where the
plaintiff had originally furnished the information to the government
before filing suit, as well as suits by plaintiffs who independently
acquired information of fraud that the government also happened
to possess. 38
3. The 1986 Amendments: Congressional Reaction to
United States ex rei. Wisconsin v. Dean 39

As in 1943,40 congressional action was once again spurred by a
judicial decision that seemed to contradict the original purposes of
the Act. 41 In Dean, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that the jurisdictional restrictions in the Act
barred a qui tam action brought by the State of Wisconsin in a civil
suit charging Medicaid fraud. 42 Under the applicable federal Medi
care statute, the state had been required to disclose its investigation
good American citizen ... has the information and he gives it to the Government, and
the Government does not proceed in due course, provision is made here where he can
get some compensation." Id. (quoting 89 CoNG REc. 10846 (1943».
37. Id.
38. See, e.g. United States ex rei. Wisconsin v. Dean; 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984)
(jurisdiction denied even where state disclosure of investigation to federal agency was
required by statute). See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text. See also United
States v. Aster, 275 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894 (1960) (jurisdiction
denied where information upon which qui tam suit was based was in the possession of
the federal government prior to the filing of a suit by the individual who provided such
information to the government); United States ex reL McCans v. Armour & Co., 146 F.
Supp. 546,550 (D.D.C. 1956), affd, 254 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 834
(1958) (government auditor barred from bringing false claims suit where notice to su
pervisors of fraudulent activity put information into possession of the government
before suit was filed).
39. 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984).
40. See supra part 1.A.2 for a discussion of the 1943 amendments. For a particu
larly detailed discussion of the case law between the 1943 and 1986 Amendments, see
Cern Kaner, Cheh-Cheng Wang ex reL The United States of America v. FMC Corp.:
False Claims Act Bar May Be Overturned by Pending Legislation, 23 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REv. 279, 282-85 (1993).
41. "Once again, the passage of time revealed that Congress, in its attempt to
evade Scylla, had steered precipitously close to Charybdis." United States ex rei.
Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (reciting thor
ough legislative history of the Act).
42. Dean, 729 F.2d at 1100.
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of Medicaid fraud to the Department of Health and Human Serv
ices. 43 The court in Dean held that this disclosure operated to pre
clude the state from acting as a qui tam plaintiff in a false claims
suit, because, following the state's required disclosure, the federal
government "had the information when the action was brought,"
thus triggering the jurisdictional bar in section 3730(b)(4).44 The
court suggested that "[i]f the State of Wisconsin desires a special
exemption to the False Claims Act because of its requirement to
report Medicaid fraud to the federal government, then it should ask
Congress to provide the exemption."45
Immediately following the court's ruling in Dean, the National
Association of Attorneys General adopted a resolution urging Con
gress to "rectify the unfortunate result" of that decision, arguing
that the court's holding unnecessarily inhibited the "detection and
prosecution of fraud on the Govemment."46
In response to both the outcry over the holding in Dean and a
concern over the growing pervasiveness of fraud against the gov
ernment, Congress moved in 1986 to amend the Act once again.47
The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the 1986 Amend
ments stated that the purpose of the proposed legislation was to
"provide the Government's law enforcers with more effective
tools" and to "encourage any individual knowing of Government
fraud to bring that information forward."48 As the means to ac
complish the second of these goals, the Senate bill increased incen
tives for private plaintiffs to bring actions on behalf of the
government, including increased awards and revision of the juris
dictional provisions that had inhibited qui tam actions since 1943.49
43.

Id. at 1103.
Id. at 1102.
Id. at 1106.
46. S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5278.
47. Id. at 2-3, 13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266-67, 5278.
48. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266-67.
49. Id. at 17, 23-30, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5282, 5288-2595. See
also False Claims Reform Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Admin. Practice
and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (statement of
Sen. Charles E. Grassley, sponsor of S. 1562), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 16, § 4, at 1-3 ("The original False Claims Act is rooted in the realization
that we cannot guard against Government fraud without the aid of private citizen in
formers.... When Congress amended the law in 1943 the act's incentive and utility for
private citizens was removed."); False Claims Act Amendments of 1986: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (statement of Rep. Berman, spon
sor of H.R. 4827), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, § 6 at 95 ("We
44.
45.
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Specifically addressing the problem faced by the State of Wisconsin
in Dean, the final version of the bill provided that actions based
upon "public disclosure of allegations" are allowed if the person
who brings the action is the "original source of the information. "50
The statute went on to define "original source" as "an individual
who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on
which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the
information to the Government before filing an action under this
section which is based on the information."51 The "original source"
language was intended by the sponsors of the legislation to preclude
the parasitic actions of the Hess era. 52 Thus, Congress attempted to
create more opportunities for private plaintiffs to bring qui tam
suits under the Act, while simultaneously maintaining a jurisdic
tional bar against the opportunistic "parasitical actions" that had
characterized such suits before the 1943 amendments.53
4.

The Language of the 1986 Amendments54

Regrettably, instead of putting the issue of "opportunity versus
must prevent suits from being dismissed simply by the Government's assertion that the
Government already had the information brought forward by the plaintiff in order to
ensure that the Government is indeed acting on that information.").
50. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988).
51. § 3730(e)(4)(B). The full text of the relevant portion of the statute is as
follows:
(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based
upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or
administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Ac
counting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news me
dia, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person
bringing the action is an original source of the information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, "original source" means an individual who
has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allega
tions are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Govern
ment before filing an action under this section which is based on the
information.
§ 3730(e)(4)(A), (B).
52. See United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). "This amend
ment seeks to assure that a qui tam action based solely on public disclosures cannot be
brought by an individual with no direct and independent knowledge of the information
or who had not been the original source to the entity that disclosed the allegations."
(statement by Sen. Grassley, sponsor, 1986 Amendments, 132 CoNG. REc. S11244
(daily ed. Aug. 11, 1986). See also supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text for a dis
cussion of parasitic actions.
53. Purcell, supra note 5, at 942-43, 948.
54. For a complete discussion of the 1986 amendments, including relevant case
law and procedural changes, see Richard J. Oparil, The Coming Impact ofthe Amended
False Claims Act, 22 AKRON L. REv. 525 (1989).
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opportunism" to rest, the 1986 amendments to the Act served only
to create additional controversy.55 Lacking clear legislative his
tory,56 the federal courts have developed a variety of individual
standards for determining whether a particular qui tam plaintiff has
crossed the line from "honest" to "parasitic" informer. 57 The courts
have wrestled with precise definitions for three key terms in the
jurisdictional bar of section 3730(e)(4): the concepts of "based
upon," "public disclosure," and "original source."58 Section
3730(e)(4)(A) provided that "[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over
an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of
allegations or transactions ... unless the action is brought by the
Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original
source of the information. "59 "Original source" was defined in sec
55. See, part II, infra, for a discussion of the split in the federal circuits. See also
Kolis, supra note 5, at 419-26 for a thorough discussion of the language of the entire
1986 amendments.
56. United States ex rei. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d
Cir. 1991). "The ... 1986 amendments underwent substantial revisions during [their]
legislative path. This provides ample opportunity to search the legislative history and
find some support somewhere for almost any construction of the many ambiguous
terms in the final version." Id.
57. H.R. REp. No. 837, l02d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, 7-8. See also part II, infra.
58. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988).
59. Id. (emphasis added). Although this Note deals with the "Original source"
provision in the jurisdictional bar of § 3730(e)(4), the manner in which a series of alle
gations can be said to be "based upon previously disclosed" information relates tangen
tially to the question of "original source" and thus bears some brief discussion. For a
thorough and detailed analysis of "based upon previously disclosed" and the case law
surrounding the jurisdictional bar of § 3730(e)(4), see Robert Salcido, Screening Out
Unworthy Whistleblower Actions: An Historical Analysis of the Public Disclosure Juris
dictional Bar to Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act, 24 Pus. CONT. L.J. 237
(1995).
The question of whether the series of allegations is "publicly disclosed" is a thresh
old question. United States ex rei. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552
(10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1364 (1993). See also BOESE, supra note 2, at 4
26. If the information upon which the false claims action is based has not been publicly
disclosed, the court questioning the applicability of the jurisdictional bar in § 3730(e)(4)
need never reach the question of whether the allegations are based upon the disclosed
information. Precision, 971 F.2d at 552-53; Wang ex reL United States v. FMC Corp.,
975 F.2d 1412, 1416 (9th CiT. 1992) ("Where there has been no 'public disclosure' within
the meaning of section 3730(e)(4)(A), there is no need for a qui tam plaintiff to show
that he is the 'original source' of the information.") (citing, e.g., United States ex rei.
Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 1991». Fur
ther, because the "based upon publicly disclosed" information is designed to be a
"quick trigger" test, the qui tam plaintiff does not have to demonstrate that it fulfills the
qualifications for an "original source" unless the information upon which the false
claims suit is founded has been held to be based upon publicly disclosed information.
Precision, 971 F.2d at 552-53. Some circuits, however, have used the "based upon pub
licly disclosed" standard as a more exacting threshold test, limiting the application of
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tion 3730 (e)(4)(B) as "an individual who has direct and independ
ent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are
based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Govern
ment before filing an action . . . which is based on the informa
tion."60 Thus, under the statute, a qui tam plaintiff could bring a
suit under the False Claims Act which was "based upon" "publicly
disclosed"61 information as long as the plaintiff was an "original
source" of that information. 62 To qualify as an "original source"
under the Act, however, a relator must first have "direct and inthe "original source" standard where some of the infonnation upon which the false
claims suit is based is in the public domain. See, e.g., United States ex rei. Springfield
Tenninal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994). See also infra notes 144-159
and accompanying text for a discussion of the District of Columbia Circuit's detailed
analysis of the "based upon/publicly disclosed" test in Quinn.
60. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
61. § 3730(e)(4). In defining the tenn "publicly disclosed," Congress specified
particular circumstances in which the threshold test might apply. § 3730(e)(4)(A). The
language of the statute precludes actions based upon "the public disclosure of allega
tions or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional,
administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investiga
tion, or from the news media." Id. This provision has been interpreted by the courts to
include any infonnation that has been disclosed through civil litigation which is on file
with the clerk's office. United States ex reL Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d
1339, 1350 (4th Cir.), cerL denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994) (citing United States ex reL
Springfield Tenninal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645,651 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States
ex rei. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Technologies Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1158 (2d
Cir.), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 2962 (1993); United States ex rei. Precision Co. v. Koch
Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548,554 n.5 (10th Cir. 1992), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 1364 (1993);
United States ex reL Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154-56 (3d Cir.
1991».
62. § 3730(e)(4)(B). Even if the infonnation has been publicly disclosed, the qui
tam plaintiff nonetheless need not show herself to be an "original source" unless the
infonnation upon which her suit is founded is "based upon" that publicly disclosed
infonnation. Precision, 971 F.2d at 552.
Some courts of appeals have held that qui tam actions are "based upon" a public
disclosure whenever the factual basis for the action has been disclosed into the public
domain. See United States ex reL Rabushka v. Crane Co., 40 F.3d 1509, 1527 (8th Cir.
1994). cerL denied. 115 S. Ct. 2579 (1995) (Magill, J., dissenting) ("'based upon' ... has
been broadly interpreted by other courts of appeals to mean 'based in any part upon"');
United States ex reL Springfield Tenninal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 652-55 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (intent of Congress was to prohibit qui tam actions if the allegations or trans
actions "were in the public domain"); Precision, 971 F.2d at 552 ("based upon" means
"supported by"); United States ex reL Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 324 (2d
Cir. 1992) (qui tam plaintiffs action is "based upon" a publicly disclosed allegation
where the relator's allegations are· "the same ... regardless of where the relator ob
tained his infonnation"). But see United States ex reL Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,
21 F.3d 1339, 1350 (4th Cir.), cerL denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994) (the proper interpreta
tion of "to base upon" is "to use as a basis for" (citation omitted); plain language of
statute indicates close relationship is required before relator can be considered to have
based qui tam action on previously disclosed allegations).
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dependent" knowledge of the information upon which the allega
tions in the qui tam suit are based. 63 Second, the relator must have
voluntarily provided the information to the government before fil
ing the qui tam 'action.64
Defendants in false claims suits soon found ambiguity in this
section, which provided support for motions to dismiss in a wide
range of circumstances.65 The courts' broad definition of the first
part of the jurisdictional analysis, whether the allegations had been
"publicly disclosed" and whether the qui tam action was "based
upon" that disclosure, served with increasing frequency to focus the
jurisdictional decision on the second part of the test, whether the
qui tam plaintiff was an "original source."66 This critical provision
has been variously interpreted by the federal courts, leading one
commentator to term it "the most litigated - and confused - issue
under the qui tam provisions."67 Some courts of appeals have im
posed an additional criterion to the statutory requirements of "di
rect and independent" and require a qui tam plaintiff to be the
source of the public disclosure, the "whistieblower," in order to
maintain jurisdiction under section 3730(e)(4).68 Other courts of
appeals have relied on the "plain language" of the statute, holding
that a qui tam plaintiff is only barred under section 3730(e)(4)
where she did not have direct and independent knowledge of the
allegations that formed the basis for her complaint. 69 The confu
sion surrounding this aspect of the jurisdictional bar has allowed
some qui tam suits to go forward where the plaintiff was not clearly
the original source of the information7o and has barred other suits
where the qui tam plaintiff was the sole source for inside informa
tion about fraud perpetuated on the federal government.71
63. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
64. Id.
65. See infra part II.
66. BOESE, supra note 2, at 4-27 to 4-34. "As the definition of 'public disclosure'
is broadened by the courts, this 'original source' question will become one of the most
critical segments of the qui tam provisions." [d. at 4-34. But see United States ex rel.
Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (detailed analysis of
"based upon/publicly disclosed" threshold test).
67. BOESE, supra note 2, at 4-35.
68. See, e.g., United States ex reL Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13
(2d Cir. 1990).
69. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994).
70. See, e.g., id.
71. See, e.g., Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir.
1992); United States ex reL Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1991).
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5. The Proposed 1992 and 1993 Amendments72
The sponsors of the 1986 amendments were not unaware of the
controversy· that had been created by the. language in section
3730(e)(4).73 Consequently, in 1992, Congress attempted to resolve
the varying interpretations of the jurisdictional bar in section
3730(e)(4) by trying to pass yet another series of amendments to
the False Claims Act. In August 1992, the House passed House Bill
4563 and sent it to the Senate accompanied by the Report of the
House Committee on the Judiciary.74 In its report, the committee
took n:ote of several federal appellate court decisions and con
cluded that "clarifications ... are necessary in light of a number of
incorrect interpretations of the parasitic suit ban in the current
Act. "75 According to the committee report, the 1992 amendment
was specifically drafted to insure that the jurisdictional bar applied
only where "all of the material facts and allegations" were drawn
from the sources enumerated in the statute.76 Further, the amend
ment was intended to set the record straight concerrung the "origi
nal source" language of the Act: "If the case is based in whole or in
pan on sources other than those described in section 3730(e)(4), it
72. See Purcell, supra note 5, at 967-76 for a detailed discussion of the 1992
amendments while they were still under consideration by Congress.
73. H.R. REp. No. 837, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1992).
74. H.R. 4563, l02d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The relevant text of the proposed
amendment provided:
(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought under subsec
tion (b) in which all of the material facts and allegations are obtained from a
news media report or reports, or a disclosure to the general public of a docu
ment or documents 
(i) created by the Federal Government;
(ii) filed in a lawsuit to which the Federal Government is a party; or
(iii) relating to an open and active investigation by the Federal Govern
ment; unless the person bringing the action is an original source of such
facts and allegations.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, an individual is an "original source" of
material facts and allegations if such individual has knowledge, independent
from the sources listed in subparagraph (A), of such facts and allegations and
has voluntarily provided them to the Government. The person bringing the
action shall also be considered an original source of any material facts or alle
gations developed as a result ofinformation provided to the Government by that
person.
Id. (emphasis added).
75. H.R. REp. No. 837, l02d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1992).
76. Id. at 13 (emphasis added). "H.R. 4563 specifically targets an overly restric
tive reading of the jurisdictional bar so as to encourage private parties to expose fraud
otherwise unknown to the government." Purcell, supra note 5, at 973 (citing H.R. REp.
No. 837, l02d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1992)).
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may pe brought by any person with access to information; from
whatever source, that will support a cause of action filed under the
Act."??
The committee report specifically cited the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's decision in United States
ex rei. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co. ("LILCO"), which re
quired a qui tam plaintiff to have "directly or indirectly been a
source to the entity that publicly disclosed the allegations on which
a suit is based,"?8 and pointedly rejected the Second Circuit's inter
pretation.?9 Instead, the committee report noted that the phrase
"material facts and allegations" was purposefully repeated in the
section of House Bill 4563 that de~1t with subject matter jurisdic
tion. 8o The use of "material facts and allegations" in House Bill
4563, in place of the phrases "allegations or transactions" and "in
formation" in the 1986 Amendments, was intended to eliminate any
textual difference that had been erroneously inferred by the courts
of appeals. 81
The House Committee had high hopes for House Bill 4563. 82
The amendments in section 3 alone were expected to increase in
centives for private plaintiffs and remove jurisdictional barriers, re
sulting in larger recoveries for the government under the False
Claims Act. 83 The committee's hopes were dashed when the bill
languished and died in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.84
In 1993, Congress again attempted to pass amendments to the
77. H.R. REp. No. 837, l02d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1992) (emphasis added).
78. Id. (quoting United States ex rei. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d
13, 16 (2d Cir. 1990)). See infra notes 100-104 and accompanying text for a discussion
of LILCO.
79. H.R. REp. No. 837, l02d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1992).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 138 CONGo REc. Sl2570 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992). The only Senate action
concerning the False Claims Act in the 102d Congress was Senate Bill 2785, introduced
in May of 1992 by Senator Thurmond, which had the sole purpose of barring any qui
tam action based on information obtained in the course or scope of government em
ployment. S. 2785, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The fates of House Bill 4563 and Sen
ate Bill 2785 are subject to speculation, although a possible clue to Congress' inaction
could be found in the fact that H.R. 4563, in addition to clarifying § 3730(e)(4), also
amended § 3730(b)(4) to allow government employees to bring qui tam suits under
carefully controlled circumstances. This change placed the House bill in direct opposi
tion to the technical amendment offered in Senate Bill 2785, which proscribed such
suits. H.R. 4563, l02d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S. 2785, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
Alternatively, the bill may have fallen prey to substantial lobbying efforts on the part of
defense contractors who have consistently resisted congressional efforts to liberalize the
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Act. A new bill, Senate Bill 841, was introduced by Senator
Charles Grassley on April 29, 1993. 85 This bill proposed a series of
amendments which would have completely stricken the jurisdic
tional bar in section 3730(e)(4) and would have instead added new
language to section 3730(b). Under the proposed amendment, the
government could have moved to dismiss a relator from a suit filed
under the False Claims Act if "all the necessary and specific mate
rial allegations contained in such action were derived from an open
and active fraud investigation by the Government."86 Senate Bill
841 was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee for
consideration. 87
Three months later, Representative' Howard Berman intro
duced House Bill 2915 in the House.88 This version of the bill also
would have stricken section 3730(e)(4) and added language to sec
tion 3730(b)(6). In addition to the language proposed in Senate Bill
841 for section 3730(b)(A)(i), the House version would have al
lowed the government to move to dismiss a qui tam plaintiff where
there was an ongoing governmental investigation which had been
initiated before the relator had filed her complaint. Under the
amendments proposed by the House, such a dismissal would be ap
propriate if the relator had learned of the facts underlying her alle
qui tam provision, fearing an increase in the number of False Claims suits. See John
Mintz, Contractors Target Whistle-Blowers, WASH. POST, May 5,1994 at B11.
85. S. 841, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). See 139 CONGo REc. S5178 (daily ed.
Apr. 29, 1993).
86. S. 841, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3730(b)(6)(A)(i) (1993) (emphasis added). The
new jurisdictional bar proposed by the Senate would also, with certain exceptions, have
precluded governmental employees from bringing suit. Id. at § 3730(b)(6)(A)(ii)(I)
(III). The relevant language of Senate Bill 841 read:
Section 3730(b) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new paragraph:
(6)(A) No later than 60 days after the date of service under paragraph (2), the
Government may move to dismiss from the action the qui tam relator if 
(i) all the necessary and specific material allegations contained in such
action were derived from an open and active fraud investigation by the
Government; or
(ii) the person bringing the action learned of the information that under
lies the alleged violation of section 3729 that is the basis of the action in
the course of the person's employment by the United States ... .

Section 3730 of title 31, United States Code, is further amended .. .
(3) in subsection (e) by striking out paragraph (4).
Id.

87.
88.

139 CONGo REc. S5178-79 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1993).
139 CoNG. REc. H6377 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993).
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gations from the news media or a congressional hearing or report.89
Subsequently, the House and Senate Committees held joint
hearings on the proposed legislation. 90 In his introductory state
ment to these hearings, Senator Grassley, noting that Senate Bill
841 was designed to clarify the provisions regarding parasitical law
suits under the False Claims Act, stated that the jurisdictional bar,
as written in section 3730(e)(4), had been intended only to exclude
those suits where the government knew of the allegations of fraud
and was already prosecuting the case. 91 Representative Berman
noted in these same hearings that House Bill 2915 was essentially
similar to Senate Bill 841 and that Congress' original purpose in the
1986 Amendments was "·to create a very narrow exception so as to
bar qui tam suits only in those instances that could legitimately be
considered parasitic and where, as a consequence, there would be
scant, if any, public interest in rewarding the qui tam [sic]
plaintiff. "92
89. H.R. 2915, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3730(b)(6)(A)(i)(I), (II), (1993). The rele
vant language of House Bill 2915 is as follows:
Section 3730(b) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new paragraph:
(6)(A) No later than 60 days after the date of service under paragraph (2), the
Government may move to dismiss from the action the person bringing the
action if 
(i) such person first learned all the necessary and specific facts underlying
the material allegations contained in the action from 
(I) a fraud investigation that the executive branch of the Government
is actively pursuing, or
(II) a news media report or a congressional hearing or report, if the
executive branch of the Government, before such person filed the
complaint in the action, commenced a fraud investigation of such al
legations on the basis of such facts, and if the executive branch is
actively pursuing such investigation; or
(ii) such person learned of the information that underlies the alleged vio
lation of section 3729 that is the basis of the action in the course of the
person's employment by the United States ....
Section 3730 of title 31, United States Code, is amended ... (3) in subsection
(e) by striking out paragraph (4).
Id.
90. The False Claims Amendments Act of 1993: Hearing on S. 841 Before the
Subcomm. on Couns and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Hearing]. See 139 CoNG. REc. D951 (daily
ed. Sept. 9, 1993).
91. 1993 Hearing, supra note 90, at 3.
92. Id. at 6 (statement of Rep. Howard Berman, sponsor of House Bill 2915).
The bottom line is that if the executive branch of the government is not ac
tively pursuing the fraud alleged in the qui tam complaint, whatever its deriva
tion, an invaluable purpose is served when the resources of the qui tam
plaintiff and counsel are applied to the pursuit of alleged wrongdoing.
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The statements of both Representative Berman and Senator
Grassley, co-sponsors of the 1986 Amendments, in the 1993 Hear
ings indicate that the intention of the "original source" provision in
the 1986 Amendments was only to preclude suits based on ongoing
governmental investigations such as those in Hess. 93 According to
Representative Berman and Senator Grassley, the 1986 Amend
ments were not intended to require that the original source, in addi
tion to having direct and independent knowledge, be the original
source to the disclosing entity. Thus, the "whistle-blower" require
ment, imposed by the Second Circuit in United States ex rei. Dick v.
Long Island Lighting Co. and by the Ninth Circuit in Wang ex rei.
United States v. FMC Corp., did not reflect the original intent of
Congress. 94 Despite the committee's clear desire to resolve this
controversy, the 103d Congress adjourned without taking any legis
lative action on Senate Bill 841 or House Bill 2915. 95
II.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT IN "ORIGINAL SOURCE"

In the decisions handed down since the passage of the 1986
Amendments to the Act, the federal courts of appeals have been
split in their interpretation of the "original source" provision of sec
tion 3730(e)(4). Their varied interpretations have revolved around
whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a qui tam suit
where the information upon which the plaintiff's suit is based has
been pUblidy disclosed. Under section 3730(e)(4), a plaintiff in
such circumstances may maintain her suit if she qualifies as an
"original source."96 The federal courts of appeals have split as to
what requirements a qui tam plaintiff must satisfy in order to be
considered an "original source."
A.

Original Source: Direct and Independent "Plus"

Two circuits, the United States Courts of Appeals for the SecId. at 9 (prepared statement of Rep. Berman).
93. 1993 Hearing, supra note 90, at 3, 6; see also United States ex reL Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text for a discus
sion of Hess. See supra part I.A for a discussion of the 1986 amendments.
94. 1993 Hearing, supra note 90, at 3, 6. Interestingly, Lisa Hovelson, testifying at
the Hearing as a representative of Taxpayers Against Fraud, noted that a significant
problem with the application of § 3730(e)(4) was the tendency of the courts to consider
"virtually any utterance to be a 'public disclosure.'" Id. at 22. See supra notes 59-62 for
a discussion of the "publicly disclosed" test of § 3730(e)(4)(A).
95. Search of LEXIS, Billtrack Library, Senate file (Nov. 1, 1994).
96. § 3730(e)(4)(A). See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text for a com
plete discussion of the original source language in § 3730(e)(4).
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ond and Ninth Circuits, have attempted to resolve the ambiguity
present in section 3730(e)(4) by adding an additional requirement,
a "plus," to the statutory standard of "direct and independent."97
These two circuits require that the original source must be a "whis
tle-blower": in addition to having direct and independent knowl
edge of the previously disclosed information, these circuits hold
that the qui tam plaintiff must also have been the source of that
information to the entity that released the information.98 For exam
ple, under the rationale of the Second and Ninth Circuits, if Jones is
aware that fraud was committed against the government by the
ABC Company, and a newspaper article has reported of fraud com
mitted against the government by ABC, Jones cannot maintain a
qui tam suit against ABC unless she has both direct and independ
ent knowledge of the fraud, apart from the information disclosed in
the newspaper report. Additionally, she must be the individual who
originally told the newspaper about the fraud. Accordingly, the
standard employed in the Second and Ninth Circuits is direct and
independent knowledge, "plus" the added requirement that the qui
tam plaintiff be the actual whistleblower. 99
Each of the two circuits that use "direct and independent plus"
as the standard for determining whether a relator qualifies as an
original source arrived at its conclusion by way of a slightly differ
ent path. loo In United States ex rei. Dick v. Long Island Lighting
Company ("LILCO"), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that a qui tam plaintiff whose complaint was
based upon publicly disclosed information must have "directly or
indirectly been a source to the entity that publicly disclosed the alle
gations. "101 The court of appeals in LILCO held that the qui tarn
plaintiffs had based their suit on information disclosed in a prior
RICO lawsuit against LILCO by the County of Suffolk, and that
they had not been the source of the information upon which Suffolk
had based its allegations. According to the Second Circuit, the lan
97. See infra note 112 for a discussion of the "direct and independent" standard.
98. See infra notes 100-109 and accompanying text.
99. Id.
100. See infra notes 101-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of United
States ex rei. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1990) and Wang ex
reI. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992).
101. LlLCO, 912 F.2d at 16 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs in LlLCO were
mid· level managers at a nuclear power station who filed suit against a lighting company,
charging that it had lied about the construction status of the power station to obtain
higher rates and thereby defrauded the United States, which was the ratepayer. Id. at
14.
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guage and legislative history of the 1986 Amendments required that
"a qui tam suit be based on information not then publicly disclosed,
unless disclosed, directly or indirectly, by the person bringing the
suit."102 The court believed that this additional requirement would
encourage potential plaintiffs to report information before it was
publicly disclosed and would end what the court termed a "conspir
acy of silence" that fostered fraud against the govemment.1°3 The
LILCO court based its conclusion on what it termed a "close tex
tual analysis combined with a review of the legislative history."l04
Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit ruled on the "original source" provision in section
3730(e)(4) in a decision that concurred with the Second Circuit's
102. Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 18.
104. Id. at 17. The relevant text of § 3730(e)(4) reads as follows:

(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based
upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or
administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Ac
counting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news me
dia, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person
bringing the action is an original source of the information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, "original source" means an individual who
has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allega
tions are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Govern
ment before filing an action under this section which is based on the
information.
§ 3730(e)(4) (emphasis added). The LILCO court focused on Congress' use of the
word "information" in sections 3730(e)(4)(A) and (e)(4)(B) and concluded that the
same word actually had different meanings in each section. The court found that "in
formation" was intended to mean "the information that was publicly disclosed" in sec
tion (e)(4)(A) and "that which supplies the basis for the qui tam action itself" in
(e)(4)(B), "a slightly more expansive definition." LILCO, 912 F.2d at 16-17. "Such a
slight difference in meaning assumes importance because it permits the interpretation
that § (4)(B) does not contain the exclusive requirements in order for one to be an
'original source' and that an additional requirement is to be found in § (4)(A)." Id. at
17. See Robert L. Vogel, Eligibility Requirements for Relators Under Qui Tam Provi
sions of the False Claims Act, 21 PuB. CONT. L.J. 593,601-04 (1992).
This construction of the jurisdictional bar was also followed in 1993 by the Second
Circuit in United States ex reL Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Technologies Corp., 985
F.2d 1148, 1158 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2962 (1993), although the court in
Kreindler never specifically addressed the additional requirement of "original source to
the disclosing entity." Id. at 1158-59. The court in Kreindler held that the plaintiff did
not have direct and independent knowledge of the allegations in the complaint and
therefore was not qualified as an original source. Id. at 1159. See also United States ex
rei. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 457 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (adopting the rea
soning of Kreindler).
See also infra notes 213-227 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fourth
Circuit's dismissal of this line of reasoning in United States ex reL Siller v. Becton Dick
inson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994).
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holding in LILCO.105 The qui tam plaintiff in Wang ex rei. United
States v. FMC Corp. was an engineer who had direct and independ
ent knowledge of alleged fraud committed by his employer in a de
fense contract, fraud that had been previously publicly disclosed
and upon which Wang had based his complaint. lo6 However, the
court in Wang found that, because the plaintiff had not been the
individual who had publicly disclosed the allegations, the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under section 3730(e)(4).107
Agreeing with the Second Circuit's holding in LILCO, the Wang
court reviewed both textual arguments and legislative history. lOB
The court concluded that the purpose of the amendments to the
Act was to encourage private individuals with knowledge of fraud
against the government to come forward and that qui tam jurisdic
tion was therefore only appropriate for those who had been instru
mental in the public disclosure of the allegations upon which the
suits were based. 109 Although Wang's knowledge was not parasitic
in nature, his suit was barred because he was not the "whistle
105. Wang ex reL United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992). See
Kaner, supra note 40.
106. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1417.
107. Id. at 1420.
108. Id. at 1418.
109. Id. The court held that if "someone republishes an allegation that already
has been publicly disclosed, he cannot bring a qui tam suit, even if he had 'direct and
independent knowledge' of the fraud. He is no 'whistle-blower.' A 'whistle-blower'
sounds the alarm; he does not echo it." [d. at 1419.
See also United States ex rei. Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 5 F.3d 407, 411 (9th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1543 (1994) (an original source must have played some
part, direct or indirect, in the public disclosure of allegations in false claims suit);
United States ex reL Fine v. Univ. of Cal., 821 F. Supp. 1356, 1360 (N.D. Cal. 1993),
rev'd, remanded sub nom. United States ex rei. Fine v. Chevron, 39 F.3d 97 (9th Cir.
1994), reh'g en banc granted, 60 F.3d 525 (1995) (relator must be original source of
information as well as direct or indirect source of public disclosure that gave rise to
jurisdictional bar). Significantly, the court in Barajas took note of the language of
§ 3730(d)(I). Barajas, 5 F.3d at 410. The court noted that "when a qui tam suit ... is
'based primarily on disclosures of specific information'" for which the plaintiff was not
an original source, the qui tam plaintiff is limited to 10% of the recovery by
§ 3730(d)(I). [d. (quoting 31 U.S.c. § 3730(d)(I) (emphasis added) (citations omit
ted». Thus, the Ninth Circuit acknowledges that § 3730(d)(I) of the Act contemplates
a set of circumstances where information upon which the original source has based her
lawsuit is not wholly original. § 3730(d)(I). See infra notes 236-240 for a discussion of
§ 3730(d)(I) and its implications for the jurisdictional bar in § 3730(e)(4).
Of tangential interest is the fact that California passed its own state false claims
statute in 1992. BOESE, supra note 2, at 4-13 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12650 et seq.
West 1992) ("The California False Claims Act"». Although the California False Claims
Act is quite similar in many respects to the federal Act, it specifically grants qui tam
jurisdiction only where the qui tam plaintiff has provided his information to the disclos
ing entity. [d. at 4-14 (citing CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12652(d)(3)(b».
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blower."110
B.

Original Source: Direct and Independent as the Standard

A second group of courts of appeals have held that a qui tam
plaintiff qualifies as an "original source" if she simply has direct and
independent knowledge of the information that was publicly dis~
closed. 111 Although the reasoning of these courts of appeals is not
always consistent and the definitions of "direct and independent"
sometimes vary,112 a majority of these courts have found the stat
ute's requirement of direct and independent knowledge to be suffi
cient, and, when ruling after the Second and Ninth Circuit's
imposition of a "whistle-blower" requirement, have expressly re
jected their line of reasoning. 113
In one of the first cases to wrestle with the interpretation of the
"original source" provision of section 3730(e)(4), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied the direct and
independent standard. The court found that the trial court had
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the information upon
which the relator's claim was based had been publicly disclosed,114
110. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1420. "While Wang was silent, some other conscientious
... person bravely brought the ... problems to the attention of the media and the
Army. If there is to be a bounty for disclosing those troubles, it should go to one who in
fact helped to bring them to light." Id. The Wang court, however, did note that all
those who either directly or indirectly disclosed an allegation might qualify as its origi
nal source. Id. at 1419. See United States ex rei. Fine v. Univ. of Cal., 821 F. Supp.
1356, 1360 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd, remanded sub nom. United States ex reL Fine v.
Chevron, 39 F.3d 97 (9th Cir. 1994), reh'g en bane granted, 60 F.3d 525 (1995) (plaintiff
who helped report allegations of fraud to government before public disclosure "directly
or indirectly" disclosed such allegations). See also United States ex reL Fine v. MK
Ferguson Co., 861 F. Supp. 1544 (D.N.M. 1994) (agreeing with the reasoning of the
Second and Ninth Circuits).
111. See United States ex rei. Barth v. Ridgedale Electric, Inc., 44 F.3d 699 (8th
Cir. 1995) (declining to rule on the question of whether the relator must also prove he
was a source of the infonnation to the entity that publicly disclosed the pertinent infor
mation as required by the Second and Ninth Circuits).
112. According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, a qui
tam plaintiff has direct knowledge of fraud when the infonnation is obtained without
benefit of any intennediate source, "marked by an absence of intervening agency."
United States ex reL Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1991).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that independent
knowledge is acquired when the relator does not learn of the infonnation through pub
lic disclosure or through the government. Houck ex rei. United States v. Folding Car
ton Admin. Comm., 881 F.2d 494, 505 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026, and
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
113. See supra notes 101-110 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 59-62 for a discussion of the "based upon/publicly disclosed"
threshold test.
.
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and that there was no evidence that the qui tam plaintiff would
have learned about the information without that public
disclosure.11 5
In Houck ex rei. United States v. Folding Carton Administrative
Committee, the plaintiff worked with individuals who were claim
ants to a settlement agreement and assisted them in filing claims to
recover money from the settlement fund. 116 In dismissing the plain
. tiff's claim, the Houck court interpreted the 1986 Amendments to
the Act as barring an action by a qui tam plaintiff which had been
based solely on publicly disclosed transactions.H 7 Although the
court found that Houck had "direct knowledge" through his assist
ance to the settlement fund claimants, the court determined that
Houck would not have learneq of the claims to the settlement fund
without public disclosure and therefore did not have the "'direct
and independent'" knowledge required of an "original source."118
Thus, the court relied on its interpretation of the phrase "direct and
independent" in the statute to determine whether it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction for plaintiff's suit. 119
United States ex rei. Stinson v. Provident Life & Accident Insur
ance Co.,12° decided shortly after Houck, was the first in a line of
cases brought under the False Claims Act by a law firm that,
through its representation of Mr. Leonard, a victim of an automo
bile accident, had become aware of alleged Medicare fraud by sev
eral insurance companies. 121 The Stinson firm concluded from its
research in the Leonard litigation that Provident's claim processing
practices violated federal law by allowing Medicare to pay as pri
mary insurer for the benefit claims of working seniors.122 Subse
115. Houck, 881 F.2d at 505.
116. Id. at 503.
117. Id. at 504.
118. Id. at 505 (quoting § 3730(e)(4)(B».
119. Id.
120. 721 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
121. Id. at 1248. The Stinson cases were all based upon an incriminating Provi
dent memo that the Stinson law firm obtained during discovery in the Leonard litiga
tion. In the memo, handwritten notations indicated that other insurance companies
handled claims in the same, allegedly improper, manner that formed the basis for the
lawsuit against Provident. United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d
1149, 1151 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing United States ex. rel. Stinson v. Provident Life & Acci
dent Ins. Co., 7.21 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Fla. 1989); United States ex reL Stinson v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield, 755 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ga. 1990); United States ex rel. Stinson et al.
v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., No. C-90-29-G, 1991 WL 210855 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 6, 1991); United
States ex rel. Stinson v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., No. 90-411, 1992 WL 125329 (E.D.
La. May 22, 1992».
122. Provident, ·721 F. Supp. at 1248. Stinson alleged that Provident had de
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quently, the Stinson law. firm filed a qui tam action against
Provident under the ACt. 123 Provident moved to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under section 3730(e)(4).124
Declining to rule on the "publicly disclosed" test,125 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida moved di
rectly to the determination of whether the Stinson firm had "direct
and independent" knowledge of Provident's alleged fraudulent
practices. 126 The court held that the information obtained by the
Stinson firm could be characterized as "direct" because Stinson was
not a "disinterested outsider" who had "simply stumble[d] across
an interesting court file."127 Stinson's information was also "in
dependent," according to the court, because it had obtained infor
mation to support its qui tam action from sources other than the
Leonard litigation. l28 Accordingly, the court found that Stinson
qualified as an "original source" under sections 3730(e)(4)(A) and
(B).129
The Leonard litigation, however, led the Stinson firm to file
additional qui tam suits. 130 Through its investigation of Provident's
allegedly fraudulent claims practices, Stinson had obtained two in
ternal Provident memoranda that indicated that other insurance
companies, including the Prudential Life Insurance Company, had
followed the same allegedly fraudulent processing practices utilized
by Provident. 131 The Stinson law firm subsequently pursued this
cause of action against these other insurance companies, filing
claims under the Act which were based on this information ob
frauded the government "by shifting ... responsibility for payment of insurance claims
to Medicare and the private sector despite Provident's knowledge and understanding of
its obligations under section 116(a) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982 ('TEFRA')." Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 59-62 for a discussion of the "based upon/publicly disclosed"
standard.
126. Provident, 721 F. Supp. at 1257.
127. Id. at 1258 (citing United States ex rei. Houck v. Folding Carton Admin.
Comm., 881 F.2d 494, 505 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026, and cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1027 (1990».
128. Id. at 1257.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., United States ex. reL Stinson v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
721 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Fla. 1989); United States ex rei. Stinson v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield Ins., 755 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
131. United States ex reL Stinson v. Prudential, 944 F.2d 1149, 1151 (3d Cir.
1991).
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tained during the Leonard lawsuit against Provident,132
Subsequent to the decision of the district court for the South
ern District of Florida, however, one of these subsequent false
claims suits filed by the Stinson firm was held to be barred by sec
tion 3730(e)(4). In United States ex rei. Stinson v. Prudential Insur
ance Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that, in this instance, Stinson was not an "original source" be
cause its suit against Prudential was based exclusively on informa
tion contained in the Provident memoranda, which had been
"previously disclosed" in the Leonard litigation. 133 The court as
serted that" 'direct' is marked by absence of an intervening agency,
instrumentality, or intluence."134 Since Stinson's information about
Prudential's claims processing had come via Provident memoranda
produced through discovery instead of through a direct investiga
tion of Prudential's processing methods, the court found that the
law firm's information was not "direct" under section 3730(e)(4),135
In dismissing the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, how
ever, the Third Circuit noted that, although the "paradigmatic 'orig
inal source' is a whistle-blowing irisider ... [o]ther relators may also
qualify if their information results from their own investiga
tions."136 While recognizing Congress' desire to encourage actions
by legitimate "whistle-blowers," the court in Prudential did not find
it necessary to impose an extra-textual requirement in order to dis
miss the qui tam plaintiff's action under section 3730(e)(4).137
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit fol
lowed Provident in United States ex rei. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus
tries, Inc. 138 In Precision, the plaintiff, a corporation, had filed suit
under the Act alleging that the defendant had understated the
quantity of crude oil and natural gas produced from federal and
Indian land, thereby defrauding the federal government of mineral
royalties,139 The defendants challenged the court's subject matter
132. Id. at 1150.
133. Id. at 1152. See supra notes 120-129 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Leonard litigation.
134. Prudential, 944 F.2d at 1160 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA
TIONAL DICfIONARY 640 (1976».
135. Id. at 1160-61.
136. Id. at 1161. Significantly, the dissent, in an opinion that retraced much of the
same legislative history used by the majority to support its opinion, concluded that suits
such as the one filed against Prudential by Stinson were not intended to be barred by
the 1986 amendments. Id. at 1171 (Scirica, J., dissenting)
137. Id. at 1661.
138. 971 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1364 (1993).
139. Id. at 550.
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jurisdiction, claiming that Precision's complaint was partially based
on information that had been publicly disclosed in "numerous news
releases. "140
The court in Precision held that suits filed by the corporation's
president, together with congressional hearings and press releases,
constituted public disclosure for the purposes of section
3730(e)(4)(A).141 Further, as the corporate qui tam plaintiff had
not come into existence until after the disclosure took place, it
could not qualify as an original source, even though its employees
had subsequently collected additional information used in the
suit. 142 Therefore, the court held, Precision's suit was barred by
section 3730(e)(4).1 43
In deciding the question of whether Precision had been an
"original source," the Tenth Circuit noted that the "[t]wo jurisdic
tional requirements [of § 3730(e)(4)(B)] ... are plain, unambiguous
and require no further scrutiny."l44
In 1994, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir
cuit faced the jurisdictional bar in section 3730(e)(4).14S The plain
tiff in United States ex rei. Springfield Terminal Railway v. Quinn
("Quinn") was a railway company that brought suit under the False
Claims Act against an arbitrator appointed to resolve a labor dis
pute between the railway and its union,146 Initially, the company's
attention had been drawn to fraudulent billing by the arbitrator
through its inspection of documents which were produced by civil
discovery in a prior suit,147 The company subsequently conducted
additional investigation which revealed extensive fraudulent billing
of the government by the arbitrator. l48
140. Id. at 551, 554. Interpreting a key provision of § 3730(e}(4}(A}, the court
held that the phrase "based upon" can be interpreted to mean "supported by." Id. at
552. Significantly, the court, while professing respect for the plain meaning of the stat
ute, offered no attributiori for this definition. Id.
141. Id. at 553.
142. Id. at 553-54.
143. Id. at 554.
144. Id. at 553. In this opinion, decided after the Second Circuit's imposition of
an additional "whistle-blower" requirement in United States ex reL Dick v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1990), the court specifically declined to read any
additional requirement into the "original source" language of the statute. Id.
145. United States ex reL Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
146. Id. at 647.
147. Id. at 647-48.
148. Id. The arbitrator had indicated on his bills to the federal government that
he had worked on certain days when, according to the company, he had not been work
ing on the railway company's dispute on those days. Id. at 648.
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The lower court in Quinn had reasoned that the company's
claim was "based upon" material unearthed during discovery in the
previous litigation and thus was "publicly disclosed."149 Since the
information was obtained through an intermediary, the district
court had held that the information was not "direct and independ
ent," and therefore the plaintiff was not an "original source" under
section 3730(e)(4).150 The D.C. Circuit disagreed, however, and
provided a detailed theoretical analysis of the "based upon publicly
disclosed" test in section 3730(e)(4)(A), the threshold test for "orig
inal source," to determine if the materials that formed the basis of
the company's suit were "in the public eye" and therefore at risk of
"parasitism."151 The court of appeals interpreted the 1986 amend
ments as having created a standard under which the "original
source" inquiry only need be reached if there is sufficient informa
tion in the public domain to expose either the fraudulent transac
tion or the allegation of fraud. 152
Extending its analysis to its determination of "original source,"
the Quinn court held that, since the relator is not required to pos
sess direct and independent knowledge of all of the vital compo
nents to a fraudulent transaction, the relator need only have
knowledge of either the fraudulent transaction or the allegation of
fraud in order to qualify as an original source.1 53 Because the infor
mation gleaned from discovery in the suit to set aside the union
settlement was not sufficient, in and of itself, to indicate fraud, the
company's additional knowledge of the arbitration proceedings and
its subsequent investigation gave it sufficient direct and independ
ent information to allow it to be considered an "original source"
149. Id. at 652.
[d. at 648-49.
Id. at 653-54. The court developed a fonnula in which X + Y = Z, where Z
represented the allegation of fraud and X and Y represented its essential elements. Id.
at 654. "In order to disclose the fraudulent transaction publicly, the combination of X
and Y must be revealed, from which readers ... may infer Z, i.e., the conclusion that
fraud has been committed." Id.
152. [d. at 651. In the language of the D.C. Circuit's fonnula, when X by itself is
in the public domain, there is insufficient infonnation to bar the qui tam suit. However,
if X and Yare publicly disclosed, or if Z is disclosed, there is little need for a qui tam
action.· Id. at 654. The court acknowledged that "[w]hen ... some infonnation relied
upon by the qui tam plaintiff is undeniably in the public domain, the task of ensuring
that qui tam suits are limited to those in which the relator has contributed significant
independent infonnation can prove tricky." Id. at 653.
153. Id. at 657. "'[D]irect and independent knowledge of infonnation on which
the allegations are based' refers to direct and independent knowledge of any essential
element of the underlying fraud ...." Id. at 657.
150.
151.
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within the meaning of section 3730(e)(4)(B).154
The court in Quinn based its understanding of the jurisdic
tional bar on what it determined to be the purpose of the frequently
amended Act: "Seeking the golden mean between adequate incen
tives for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely valuable informa
tion and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no
significant information to contribute of their own. "155 The court
concluded that "[t]he goal of avoiding suits that merely drain the
public fiSC 156 is amply advanced by a construction of
§ 3730(e)(4)(A) that bars suit only when specific allegations of
fraud or the vital ingredients to a fraudulent transaction exist in the
public eye. "157 Although clearly concerned with blocking parasitic
suits, the Quinn court did not impose the LILCO or Wang require
ment that the qui tam plaintiff be a "whistle-blower" in order to
qualify as an "original source."158 By shifting the focus of its in
quiry to the "based upon/publicly disclosed" test of section
3730(e)(4)(A), the court in Quinn found it "unnecessary" to decide
whether the relator must additionally have been responsible for the
public disclosure of the fraud upon which his suit was based. 159
Two months later, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit firmly rejected the requirement, imposed by the
courts in LILCO and Wang, that the relator be the source of the
publicly disclosed information to the disclosing entity ("direct and
independent plus").I60 The qui tam plaintiff in United States ex rei.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 649.
.
156. . A "fisc" is defined as a state or royal treasury. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COL·
LEGIATE DlcrIONARY 439 (1993).
157. Quinn. 14 F.3d at 657 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 656-57.
159. Although it was clearly aware of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Wang ex reL
United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992), the Quinn court never even
mentioned the "whistle-blower" requirement in its discussion of "original source."
Quinn, 14 F.3d at 651, 653,656-57 (citing Wang, 975 F.2d at 1416, 1418). The "factual
posture" of the case rendered this decision "unnecessary." Id. at 657 n.12 (citing Wang,
975 F.2d at 1418; United States ex reL Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 16
17 (2d Cir. 1990». "Springfiel" would in any event satisfy [this requirement] without
question." Id. Significantly, the D.C. Circuit's formula for determining whether a rela
tor's suit was "based upon publicly disclosed" material narrows the reading of this
threshold test and enables a false claims suit to move forward if the relator has based
her action on material which is only partially in the public domain. Id. at 653-56. This
restriction of the formerly broadly read "quick trigger test" offers additional protection
against the parasitic suits that were the target of the Second and Ninth Circuits when
they imposed their "whistle-blower" requirement on § 3730(e)(4) and may result in
fewer tests of the "original source" provision of the jurisdictional bar.
160. United States ex reL Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1351-53
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Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co. was employed by a distributor of
health care products. 161 In a previous state court lawsuit, the dis
tributor had claimed its distributorship agreement had been can
celed because the manufacturer of the health care products feared
disclosure of its practice of overcharging the government. 162 After
the suit concerning the distributorship agreement was settled, the
qui tam plaintiff filed a suit against the manufacturer under the Act,
asserting that he originally learned of the manufacturer's fraudulent
practices through independent investigation undertaken during his
employment and not as a result of the previous litigation. 163
In dismissing the plaintiff's suit for lack of subject matter juris
diction, the district court had adopted the standard set forth by the
Second Circuit in LILCO. The district court found that the distrib
utor was the entity that had publicly disclosed the allegations and
that, since Siller was not the source of those allegations, he was not
the "original source," even though he might have had "direct and
independent knowledge" of the information. 164 The court of ap
peals reversed the district court and rejected the logic of the Second
Circuit on this issue, holding that the requirement that a relator
must also be a source to the disclosing entity was "not merely un
persuasive, but implausible. "165
The Siller court also discussed the Ninth Circuit's accord in
Wang ex rei. United States v. FMC Corp . .166 The court in Siller con
cluded that the Ninth Circuit in Wang actually had rejected the
LILCO court's statutory analysis, while purporting to adopt its in
terpretation of "original source. "167 The Siller court further con
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994) (citing LlLCO, 912 F.2d at 16; Wang, 975
F.2d at 1418).
161. Id. at 1340-41.
162. Id. at 134l.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1351. See also United States ex reL Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co.,
912 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1990) and supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text. The Siller
court held that "any information disclosed through civil litigation and on file with the
clerk's office should be considered a public disclosure of allegations in a civil hearing
for purposes of section 3730(e)(4)(A)." Siller, 21 F.3d at 1350. As such, the informa
tion in the SSI complaint was publicly disclosed. Id. at 1351. See also supra notes 59-62
for a discussion of the "based upon/publicly disclosed" standard.
165. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1351 (citing LILCO, 912 F.2d at 16-17). See supra notes
100-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Second Circuit's holding in
LILCO. See also infra notes 213-227 for a complete discussion of the Fourth Circuit's
analysis of the LILCO decision. See also Vogel, supra note 104, at 601-04.
166. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1353 (citing Wang ex reL United States v. FMC Corp., 975
F.2d 1412, 1418 (9th Cir. 1992).
167. Id.
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cluded that the statutory requirement of "direct and independent"
was sufficient to prevent parasitic suits and that the additional re
quirement that the qui tam plaintiff be a "whistle-blower" imposed
a criterion not intended by Congress. 168
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is the most re
cent court to wrestle with the question of whether a qui tam plain
tiff must also be a "whistle-blower" in order to maintain jurisdiction
under the act.1 69 In Cooper ex rei. United States v. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Florida, Inc.,11° the qui tam plaintiff filed a suit
under the Act charging his medical insurance company with fraudu
lent billing practices. 171 Even though the qui tam plaintiff had noti
fied members of Congress and a federal agency of his allegations,
the Eleventh Circuit held that, because Cooper had acquired his
knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing through years of researching
claims, he therefore had direct knowledge obtained independently
of any disclosed allegations.1 72 The court noted that the original
source inquiry was designed to be the focus of the Act's jurisdic
tional provisions and held that the plaintiff fulfilled the require
ments of an "original source."173
168. Id. at 1355. See also infra notes 228-235 and accompanying text for a com
plete discussion of the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Wang.
169. Cooper ex reL United States v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc., 19 F.3d 562
(11th Cir. 1994). Since the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Cooper, the United States
Courts of Appeals for the FIrst and Eighth Circuits have also dealt with the issue of
"original source" and the jurisdictional bar in § 3730(e)(b)(4). United States ex reL
LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 874 F. Supp. 35 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 62 F.3d 1411 (1st Cir. 1995)
(qui tam relator's action barred because plaintiff actually derived allegations from pub
lic disclosure); United States ex reL Barth v. Ridgedale Electric, Inc., 44 F.3d 699 (8th
Cir. 1995) (qui tam plaintiff must have independent and direct knowledge to satisfy
subject matter jurisdiction; "We do not reach the question whether the relator must also
satisfy a third requirement [whistle-blower] ... as detennined by the Second and Ninth
Circuits."); see also United States ex reL Rabushka v. Crane Co., 40 F.3d 1509 (8th Cir.
1994), cerL denied 115 S. Ct. 2579 (1995) (narrowing the based upon/publicly disclosed
test to avoid the "original source" inquiry). In addition, the District Court for the East
ern District of Louisiana has ruled that a private plaintiff is not an original source under
the statute where it did not come into existence until after public disclosure. United
States ex reL Federal Recovery Services, Inc. v. Crescent City EMS, Inc., No. 91-4150,
1993 WL 345655 (E.D. La. Aug. 30, 1993), reh'g denied by United States v. Crescent
City EMS, Inc., No-4150, 1994 WL 518171 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 1994).
170. 19 F.3d 562 (11th Cir. 1994).
171. Id. at 564.
172. Id. at 568.
173. Id. at 568 n.10 (citing United States ex reL Precision v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971
F.2d 548, 552 (10th Cir. 1992), cen. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1364 (1993». See also False
Claims Act Implementation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Gov.
Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990) [hereinaf
ter 1990 Implementation Hearing). Congress wanted to both encourage citizen involve
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Citing the Tenth Circuit's holding in Precision, the Cooper
court noted that the "based upon" test was intended to be a "quick
trigger" test, forcing inquiry forward to the more exacting standard
of "original source."174 The court specifically rejected the Second
Circuit's holding in LILCO requiring the relator to prove he was
the original source of the information to the disclosing entityP5
The Cooper court found no support for this rule in the plain lan
guage or in the legislative history, noting that "[t]his requirement
would impose a tough burden on the relator and could discourage
citizen involvement; even when the citizen has direct and independ
ent knowledge of fraud."176
III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

While rejecting what it termed to be a flawed analysis of legis
lative history by the Second and Ninth Circuits, the Fourth Circuit,
in United States ex rei Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., pointed out
a fundamental problem with many of the decisions in which other
courts of appeals have attempted to apply the jurisdictional bar in
section 3730(e)(4).177 Citing the Third Circuit in United States ex
rei. Stinson v. Prudential Insurance Co. and its attempt to glean the
true meaning of the statute from the "principal intent" of the legis
lation, the Fourth Circuit warned that it was
[E]specially inappropriate (not to mention frighteningly treacher
ous) to attempt, as these courts have done, to distill from such
broad, generalized objectives, the answers to the kind of specific
statutory questions that we herein address; fine calibrations are
just not possible through the use of such crude instruments. This
is particularly so in this context, given that, although we can per
haps divine from these abstract purposes a congressional inten
tion to balance the need to encourage qui tam actions against the
need to prevent parasitic suits, we can discern virtually nothing as
to precisely how Congress ultimately believed it achieved that
balance. If the language of law is to have any meaning at all,
then surely it must prevail over the kind of speculation that is
entailed in such an enterprise as these courts have undertaken. 178
ment and prevent parasitical suits. "[T]he resolution of this question rests on how the
law's 'original source' doctrine will be interpreted." Id. (statement of Sen. Grassley).
174. Cooper, 19 F.3d at 568 n.10 (citing Precision, 971 F.2d at 552).
175. Id. at 568 n.13.
176. Id.
177. United States ex rei. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1351-54
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994).
178. Id. at 1354-55 (citing United States ex rei. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944
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A.

Statutory Construction

The final section of the Fourth Circuit's opInIon in Siller
strongly emphasizes the "language of the law" and warns against
the imprecise use of legislative history in statutory construction. 179
The proper use of legislative history in statutory construction has
long troubled the courts.180 The foundation of a democracy rests on
the separation of powers; with this in mind, the unelected judiciary
frequently feels pressure to take the expectations of the legislature
into consideration when interpreting statutes. 181 Nonetheless, there
has been considerable debate over the proper emphasis to place
upon legislative history in statutory construction and which forms
of legislative history are most useful.1 82 Text is concededly the pre
ferred starting point in statutory construction, and textual argu
ments are frequently persuasive. 183 The language of a statute can
F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 1991». See also Robert J. Araujo, S.J., The Use of Legislative
History in Statutory Interpretation: A Look at Regents v. Bakke, 16 SETON' HALL
LEGIS. J. 57 (1992).
[S]ome elements of the legislative history of a statute can conflict with other
components. One part of legislative history supporting one view can be offset
by another element of it.... [F]or each element of legislative history support
ing one view, there often exists an equal, but opposite supporting a conflicting
view.... These problems should not, however, automatically eliminate consid
eration of legislative history from the interpretive process.
.
Id. at 145.
179. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1354-55. Justice Stevens, in a 1992 article, suggested that
statutory construction fundamentally rests on the following canons, which should be
evaluated in sequence: (1) Read the statute, i.e., look to the plain meaning of the lan
guage of the statute; (2) Read the entire statute; (3) Read the statute in its contempo
rary context; (4) If ambiguity persists, consult the legislative history; (5) Avoid an
interpretation that would produce absurd results. See Justice John.Paul Stevens, The
Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 V. PA. L. REv. 1373 (1992).
180. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 V.C.L.A. L. REv. 621, 624
(1990) (complete discussion of the various theories of statutory construction as inter
preted by the Supreme Court). See also Jane Ellen Warner, Environmental Law-The
Household Waste Exclusion Clarification: 42 U.S.c. § 6921 (i): Did Congress Intend to
Exclude Municipal Solid Waste Ash from Regulation As Hazardous Waste Under Subti
tle C?, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 149, 167-175 (1994).
181. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Prac
tical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 324 (1990). See also Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legisla
tive History and the Interpretation ofStatutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory
Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1300 (1990).
182. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 181, at 324.
183. Id. at 354. This reflects a view that it is the language of the law alone that has
been approved by the legislature and signed by the President, and that legislative
supremacy therefore dictates that an interpreter P3Y close attention to the text of the
statute. Id. "The beginning, and usually the end, of statutory interpretation should be
the apparent meaning of the statutory language." Id. at 340. See also Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Laws as a Law of Rules, 56 V. Ou. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
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totally control statutory interpretation, however, only if the text is
unambiguous. 184 Legislators sometimes purposely leave ambigui
ties in a statute to build support for its passage, with the under
standing that courts or agencies will then be charged with its
interpretation,185 Further, regardless of the spedfic language of the
statute, the meaning of any text is always influenced by context. 186
And, while it is true that it is only the text of a statute that has the
formal assent of Congress and the President, it is hard to imagine
that the President or any member of Congress would have the time
to carefully read the over 7,000 pages of enacted bills passed in an
average session of Congress. 187
Another difficulty with accepting the plain language of a stat
ute as exclusively authoritative lies with authorship. Members of
Congress rarely draft their own legislation, delegating that responsi
bility to committee staff, lobbyists, the Office of Legislative Coun
sel, or accepting recommendations from the executive branch. 188 In
interpreting the plain language of a statute, therefore, courts fre
quently feel justified in seeking guidance from the legislature that
enacted the law. 189
In a significant number of cases, the Supreme Court has ap
plied the "soft" plain meaning rule of statutory construction, which
allows the court to use legislative history' where the statutory lan
guage is ambiguous or in direct conflict with congressional intent. 190
In a democratic system ... the general rule of law has special claim to prefer
ence, since it is the normal product of that branch of government most respon
sive to the people .... Statutes that are seen as establishing rules of inadequate
clarity or precision are criticized, on that account, as undemocratic - and, in
the extreme, unconstitutional' - because they leave too much to be decided
by persons other than the people's representatives.
Id. at 1176.
184. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 181, at 341.
185. Id. at 347.
186. Id. at 342.
187. Zeppos, supra note 181, at 1311-12 & n.63.
188. Id. at 1312-13. For an illustrative analysis of the flaws inherent in the process
of drafting and passing legislation, see Eric J. Gouvin, Truth in Savings and the Failure
of Legislative Methodology, 62 U. eIN. L. REv. 1281, 1316-53 (1994).
189. Araujo, supra note 178, at 123-24, 127. See also Jane S. Schachter,
Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108
HARV. L. REv. 593,599-60,604-06 (1995). "The role of the court is, in essence, to erase
its own role - that is, to limit its interpretive work to a fairly mechanical retrieval of
legislative meaning." Id. at 597.
190. Eskridge, supra note 180, at 628 (citing, e.g., Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36
(1986); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986); Midatlantic Nat'l
Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Protection,474 U.S. 494 (1986». See also Holder v. Hall,
114 S. Ct. 2581, 2612 & n.28 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Since the elevation of
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The danger inherent in this "soft" rule is that virtually any docu
ment which offers an explanation of a statute can be used in statu
tory construction to determine congressional intent. 191 This is
particularly problematic where the court is attempting to recreate
the intent of the enacting Congress by tracing the eV9lution of the
statute from early legislative proposals to enactment.192
Despite the problems inherent in an in-depth search for legisla
tive history, "in an inquiry toreconstruct Congress' original intent
or purpose, much of what passes as legislative history is obviously
relevant."193 However, as the Fourth Circuit noted in United States
ex rei. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., and as the Third Circuit
observed in United States ex rei. Stinson v. Prudential, a statute that
relies too heavily upon legislative history for its meaning is subject
to a wide variance of interpretations. l94 Therefore, the choice of
which legislative history to use in interpreting a statute is of para
mount importance.
The Supreme Court has determined that the most authoritative
source of congressional intent is found in committee reports, espe
cially conference committee reports, which provide insight into the
intent of those who were responsible for the language of the stat
ute. 195 Sponsor statements are also given substantial weight by the
Justice Scalia to the bench, the Court has adopted a "harder" plain meaning rule and is
more reluctant to use legislative history either as confirmation of the plain meaning of
the statute or as a contradiction of the statute's "apparently plain meaning." Eskridge,
supra note 180 at 656-57.
191. Warner, supra note 180, at 170 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421
(1986); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982); Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980».
192. Eskridge, supra note 180, at 630 (citing, e.g., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237 (1985); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Gover
nors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137 (1984».
193. Id. at 632. The Supreme Court has identified areas where legislative history
is useful in statutory construction. Warner, supra note 180, at 170. Where the literal
interpretation of the statute is in direct conflict with clearly expressed congressional
intent, a court would be "overreaching" if it failed to consider legislative history. Id.
(citing Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571). Where a literal interpretation of the statute produces
an "absurd result," judges must use the statute's legislative history to develop a "ra
tional construction" of the statute. Id. at 171 (citing Stevens, supra note 179, at 1383).
Where the statute's language is ambiguous and cannot be interpreted literally, the
courts must look to legislative history. Id.
194. United States ex rei. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1354
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Q. 316 (1994); United States ex rei. Stinson V. Prudential,
944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 1991).
195. Eskridge, supra note 180, at 637. "'A committee report represents the con
sidered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and
studying proposed legislation.'" Id. (quoting Zuber V. Allen, 396 U.S. 168,186 (1969».
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Court when determining legislative intent, unless they are ambigu
ous and contradicted by floor and hearing colloquy.196 Evidence of
proposals that have been rejected by Congress is not usually consid
ered primary legislative history.197 The Court is also wary of testi
mony in committee hearings and of floor debate, unless the
discussion is concerned with "precise analyses . . . by the sponsors
of the proposed laws. "198
In an application with significance for the statutory interpreta
tion of section 3730(e)(4), the Supreme Court has indicated that
congressional acts occurring after the passage of legislation (subse
quent or post-enactment legislative history) may be accorded
weight in statutory construction. 199 This is especially true where
Congress has passed a statute to clarify an earlier statute, or a legis
lative committee has made a post-enactment pronouncement with
respect to previously enacted legislation~20o Moreover, a pro
nouncement may be accorded significant .weight when the commit
tee responsible for the post-enactment report also reported the bill
that became law, and the Post-ellactment report was issued within
196. Eskridge, supra note 180, at 637-38.
"[R]emarks ... of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted, are an au
thoritative guide to the statute's construction," because the sponsors are the
Members of Congress most likely to know what the proposed legislation is all
about, and other Members can be expected to pay special heed to their charac
terizations of the legislation.
Id. at 638 (quoting Northaven Bd. of Educ. ·v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,526-27 (1982». See
also National Woodworkers Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S; 612, 640 (1967) ("It is the
sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt."). But
see Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1496 n.15 (1994) (debating the
usefulness of partisan statements by members of COngress).
197. Eskridge, supra note 180, at 638-39.
198. Id. at 639 (quoting S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 13
n.9 (1972».
199. Id. at 635-36 (citing, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702,
2715-17 (1989); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 148-52 (1987); Andrus v. Shell Oil Co.,
446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980». Although subsequent history is usually too ambiguous to
be useful as legislative history, the Court does occaSionally take it into consideration.
"'[W]hile the views of subsequent Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent
of the enacting one, such views are entitled to significant weight, and particularly so
when the precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure.'" Id. at 640 (quoting Sea
train Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980) (citations omitted».
But see Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 649 (1990) (subse
quent legislative history forms hazardous basis for determination of congressional in
tent). See infra notes 241-263 and accompanying text for a discussion of the import of
subsequent legislative history on the interpretation of § 3730(e)(4).
200. Warner, supra note 180, at 174 (citing Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498
U.S. 395 (1991); Sioux 1fibe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 329-30 (1942».
But see United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962).
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five years of the originallegislation.201
There are, however, legitimate concerns with the reliability of
many of these forms of legislative history in statutory construc
tion. 202 The "intent" ascribed to the legislative body is, in fact, the
collective intent of a group of individuals who each may have had a
different motive for approving the legislation at hand, and that mo
tive may have had nothing to do with the legislator's understanding
of the language of the statute. 203 Further, although statements in
committee reports and the views of the sponsors of the legislation
are presumed to be representative of the views of the legislature as
a whole, they are not necessarily representative of the entire Con
gress. 204 As for cleaving to the purpose of the statute, the actual
"purpose" of the statute may be a hybrid of legislators' responses to
pressures from special interest groupS.205
The "original source" provision in section 3730(e)(4) is an ex
ample of an instance where traditional statutory construction has
resulted in varying interpretations. 206 This may not be surprising
considering the fact that the "plain language" of the statute is any
thing butplain, and the legislative history is susceptible to divergent
interpretation.207 Faced with the challenge of identifying the "true
meaning" of the original source provision, the circuits that have had
a recent opportunity to review the jurisdictional bar in section
3730(e)(4) have attempted to present an approach to the interpre
tation of the statute that would ensure the application of the bar in
the manner closest to that intended by Congress.208 A step-by-step
analysis of statutory construction coupled with a comparison of the
various circuit decisions suggests not only that an application of the
201. Warner, supra note 180, at 174 (citing Sioux Tribe, 316 U.S. at 329-30; An
drus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 (1980».
202. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 181, at 327.
203. Id. at 326.
204. Id. at 327. See also Araujo, supra note 178, at 131 & n.296 (citing Joseph
Chamberlain, The Courts and Committee Reports, 1 U. CHI. L. REv. 81, 82 (1933».
205. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 181, at 334-35. The questions that are deter
minative in evaluating the usefulness of any sort of legislative history are based on the
relative reliability of the source of the history. Eskridge, supra note 180, at 635. Does
the source accurately reflect the views of the enacting Congress? Is the source well
informed? Is there a possibility that either individual members of Congress or groups
with a particular bias were attempting to "pack" the legislative history to influence
.
future judicial review? Id.
206. See supra part II for a discussion of the various circuit holdings on the "orig
inal source" provision.
207. See, e.g., United States ex reL Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994).
208. Id.
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standard of "direct and independent knowledge" is the best test of
"original source" in section 3730(e)(4) but also that the imposition
of a "whistle-blower" requirement is unnecessary to achieve the
goals of the legislation. This application of the jurisdictional bar is
the surest way of achieving Congress' dual purposes of encouraging
private citizens with knowledge of fraud to come forward while pro
tecting against false claims lawsuits that are truly parasitic in nature.
Of the recent court of appeals decisions which have wrestled with
the jurisdictional bar in section 3730(e)(4), the Fourth Circuit's de
cision in United States ex reL Siller v. Becton'Dickinson & Co. rep
resents the most thorough and thoughtful analysis.
B.

Statutory Construction and Its Application in Section
3730(e)(4)

1.

Plain Language

In its interpretation of the jurisdictional bar in section
3730(e)(4), the Fourth Circuit in Siller carefully applied a reasoned
analysis of the plain language of the statute in combination with a
judicious use of the appropriate legislative history.209 Accordingly,
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Siller offers the best starting point
for a reasoned analysis of the statute among the varied holdings of
the other federal courts of appeals.
The Siller court began its analysis by looking carefully at the
plain language of the statute.210 To better understand the "original
source" provision in section 3730(e)(4), the court replaced the
words "original source" in (e)(4)(A) with the words of its definition
in (e)(4)(B). The court determined that the language of the statute,
when read in this form, required only that the qui tam plaintiff: (1)
have direct and independent knowledge of the information on
which the allegations of false claim are based; and (2) voluntarily
provide the information to the government before filing her qui
tam suit.211 Read in this form, the plain language of the statute
209, Id,
210. Id. at 1351. See Stevens, supra note 179, at 1374,
211. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1351. With this substitution, according to the Fourth Cir
cuit, subparagraph (A) would then be properly read as follows:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action ... based upon the public dis
closure of allegations ... in a ... civil ... hearing ... unless . .. the person
bringing the action . .. has direct and independent knowledge of the information
on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information
to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on
the information.
Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (1988) (emphasis added».
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imposes no additional requirement that the relator be a source to
the original disclosing entity.212
The Siller court's interpretation of the language of the statute
was a direct rejection of the logic of the Second Circuit in
LILCO.213 The Fourth Circuit noted that the Second Circuit in
LILCO had focused on the word "information," which appears in
both sub-paragraphs (A) and (B) of the statutory definition of
"original source."214 The Second Circuit had concluded that the
word "information" was intended to mean different things in each
paragraph,215 and held that this "'slight difference in meaning ...
permits the interpretation that [section] (4)(B) does not contain the
exclusive requirements in order for one to be an 'original source'
and that an additional requirement is to be found in [section]
(4)(A)."'216
The Siller court disagreed with the Second Circuit's interpreta
tion: "it is so unlikely that Congress would have even noticed the
technical redundancy, that no significance can reasonably be in
ferred."217 Instead, the Fourth Circuit in Siller argued that a
straightforward reading of the language of the statute expressly
contradicted the Second Circuit's interpretation and provided sup
port for its conclusion that requiring a qui tam plaintiff to be a
"whistle-blower" would be extra-textual.218
2.

Legislative History

Although it found ample support within the plain language of
the statute for its interpretation of the "original source" require
ment in section 3730(e)(4), the Fourth Circuit went further and re
viewed the complex legislative history of the Act to determine if its
conclusion was supported by comments of the enacting Congress. 219
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1351-53 (citing United States ex reL Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co.,
912 F.2d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1990».
214. Id. at 1352.
215. Id. at 1351-53 (citing LlLCO, 912 F.2d at 16). The textual analysis of the
Second Circuit concluded that the word "infonnation" in § 3730(e)(4)(A) referred to
the infonnation that has previously been publicly disclosed. The word "infonnation" in
§ 3730(e)(4)(B), however, according to the Second Circuit, referred to the infonnation
upon which the relator based her false claims suit. Id. (citing LlLCO, 912 F.2d at 16).
See supra note 51 for the relevant text of § 3730(e)(4).
216. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1352 (quoting LlLCO, 912 F.2d at 16).
217. Id. at 1352.
218. Id. at 1351-54 (citing LlLCO, 912 F.2d 13). See also Vogel, supra note 104,
at 603.
219. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1351-54.
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The Fourth Circuit concluded that there were fundamental flaws in
the Second Circuit's reliance on legislative history from the 1986
amendments. 22o The Siller court reasoned that the requitement
that the relator be both independently informed of the allegations
and also the source of their disclosure imposed "an additional, ex
tra-textual requirement that was not intended by Congress."22l
In rejecting the reasoning applied in LILCO, the Fourth Cir
cuit pointed to a flaw in the Second Circuit's use of the legislative
history of the 1986 amendments.222 The Fourth Circuit in Siller
found that the Second Circuit had manufactured an ambiguity
when it assigned two different meanings to the word 'important' in
sections 3730(e)(4)(A) and (B) "in order to justify use of [legisla
tive] history as dispositive evidence of congressional intent."223 Ac
cording to the Siller court, the Second Circuit improperly based its
analysis on legislative history for the 1986 amendments, which re
ferred to language that was later significantly altered. 224 The Sen
ate Report that accompanied the 1986 amendments when they were
reported to the floor of the Senate225 was based on statutory lan
guage that was substantially changed between the time of the re
port, July 26, 1986, and the final passage of the legislation, October
7, 1986.226 "These ... changes suggest that, even assuming that
Congress may at one point have intended a plaintiff to be a source
to the disclosing entity [in order] to be an original source, which is
220. Id. at 1352
221. Id. at 1351.. "[I]t is unlikely that Congress intended implicitly to include this
... requirement in the definition of original source .... [T]he relator'S role was anything
but parasitic.... [T]he Second Circuit effectively overrode [the] judgment of Con
gress." Vogel, supra note 104, at 603.
222. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1352.
223. Id.
.
224. Id. at 1352-55 (citing LlLCO, 912 F.2d at 17 (quoting 132 CoNG. REc. 20536
(1986». The court in LILCO cited floor comments by Senator Grassley, sponsor of the
amendments, that referred to a version of the amendments which was later significantly
altered. Id. at 1353 (citing LlLCO, 912 F.2d at 17). After the Senate Report was filed,
Congress deleted "the media" from the list of entities which the original source was
required to inform. Id. Congress also inserted a provision requiring the qui tam plain
tiff to inform the government "before filing [the] action." Id. (quoting 31 V.S.c.
§ 3730(e)(4)(B) (1988». According to the Fourth Circuit, these two changes suggest
that Congress did not intend to enact a provision into the law that would have required
the plaintiff to be a source to the disclosing entity in order to qualify as an original
source. Id.
225. S. REp. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess, (1986), reprinted in 1986 V.S.C.C.A.N.
5266.
226. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, Vol. 1 § 11, Vol 2 § 30. See also, Sil
Ler, 21 F.3d at 1352-53 and supra note 224 for a discussion of some of the changes that
were made in the bill after the Senate Report was submitted.
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anything but clear, it ultimately chose not to enact such a require
ment into law."227
The Fourth Circuit in Siller noted further that the Ninth Circuit
in Wang, although seemingly in accord with the Second Circuit's
"whistle-blower" requirement, rested its conclusion on a completely
different section of the Act's legislative history.228 The Siller court
similarly rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis. 229
The Ninth Circuit in Wang had reasoned that one of the pur
poses of the 1986 amendments to section 3730(e)(4) was to "cor
rect" the holding in United States ex rei. Wisconsin v. Dean, where a
plaintiff with first hand knowledge of fraudulent activity who had
voluntarily disclosed information to the government was nonethe
less barred from bringing a qui tam action.230 The Siller court
noted, however, that the jurisdictional provision in effect at the
time of the decision in Dean did not bar qui tam suits that were
based upon prior public disclosures; the jurisdictional bar at that
time prohibited only suits that were based upon "evidence or infor
mation in the possession ofthe United States . .. at the time such suit
was brought."231 The Fourth Circuit found that the Ninth's Cir
cuit's error was in assuming, without explanation, that Congress
would not have been able to "correct" Dean without requiring that
a plaintiff have provided information to the disclosing entity.232
The Siller court observed that the language of section 3730(e)(4)(B)
provides that a plaintiff who has produced his independently ob
tained information to the government is excepted from the jurisdic
tional bar of section 3730(e)(4)(A) and that this requirement alone
served to solve the problem presented by the court's decision in
Dean. 233 Thus, according to the Fourth Circuit,. a correction of
Dean would not have forced Congress to require that a qui tam
plaintiff provide information to the "disclosing entity" in order to
227. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1353.
228. Id. (citing Wang ex rei. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1418-19
(9th Cir. 1992».
.
229. Id. at 1353-54 (citing Wang, 975 F.2d at 1418-19)..
.
230. Id. at 1354 (citing United States ex reL State of Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F. 2d
1100, 1104 (7th CiT. 1984); Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419 (citing S. REp. No. 345, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266). See supra notes 39-45 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Dean.
231. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1354 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 232(c) (1982) (superseded) (em
phasis added». See supra note 35 for the relevant text of § 3730(b)(4) and supra notes
39-45 for a discussion of Dean.
232. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1354.
233. Id.
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be considered an "original source."234 The Siller analysis of the
Act's legislative history demonstrates no support for the contention
that Congress intended the relator to be a "whistle-blower" in order
to maintain her suit under the False Claims Act. 235
C. Additional Support for "Direct and Independent" as the
Standard for Original Source
1.

The Surrounding Language of the Statute

When read in light of the surrounding sections of the jurisdic
tional provisions in the statute,236 the implausibility of the extra
textual requirement, imposed by LILCO and Wang in the applica
tion of section 3730(e)(4), becomes more apparent. In section
3730(d)(1), "Award to Qui Tam Plaintiff," the 1986 amendments to
the False Claims Act specifically restrict the amount of an award
that can be paid to a qui tam plaintiff where the action is one
"which the court finds to be based primarily on disclosures of spe
cific information (other than information provided by the person
bringing the action) relating to allegations or transactions in a ...
hearing, ... [or] report ... or from the news media."237 This section
of the 1986 amendments comes directly before the jurisdictional
provision in section 3730(e)(4) and does not refer to any require
ment that the qui tam plaintiff be responsible for furnishing any of
the information. to the disclosing entity.238 Moreover, section
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Stevens,supra note 179, at 1376.
237. 31 U.S.c. § 3730(d)(1) (1988). The full text of the applicable provision reads
as follows:
(1) If the Government proceeds with an action brought by a person under
subsection (b), such person shall, subject to the second sentence of this para
graph, receive at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds
of the action or settlement of the claim, depending upon the extent to which the
person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action. Where the
action is one which the court finds to be based primarily on disclosures of
specific information (other than information provided by the person bringing
the action) relating to allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or admin
istrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Account
ing Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, the
court may award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in no case more
than 10 percent of the proceeds, taking into account the significance of the
information and the role of the person bringing the action in advancing the case
to litigation.
Id. (emphasis added). See supra part I.A.3-4 for a full discussion of the 1986
amendments.
238. § 3730(d)(1).
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3730(d)(l) clearly anticipates that a plaintiff may file a suit under
the False Claims Act where at least some of the information upon
which the qui tam suit is based is not original with the relator. 239
As the two provisions share much of the same language,240 the fact
that section 3730(d)(l) does not require the qui tam plaintiff to play
a hand in the public disclosure of the allegations that form a part of
the suit, coupled with the lack of any such requirement in section
3730(e)(4), is compelling evidence that Congress believed the "orig
inal source" language of (e)(4)(B) to be sufficient to protect it from
parasitic actions.
2. Post-Enactment Legislative History
The Third Circuit in United States ex rei. Stinson v. Prudential
Insurance Co. noted that "[t]he ... 1986 amendments underwent
substantial revisions during [their] legislative path. This provides
ample opportunity to search the legislative history and find some
support somewhere for almost any construction of the many ambig
uous terms in the final version. "241 In fact, Judge Scirica's dissent in
Prudential used the same series of congressional reports and imple
mentation hearings as the Prudential majority in support of his ar
guments. 242 As it was used to support the rationale of both the
Prudential majority and the dissent, it seems that the pre-enactment
legislative history of the False Claims Act offers no clearer guidance
to congressional intent than does the language of the jurisdictional
bar itself.
If, however, the Senate had passed the 1992 amendments to
the False Claims Act, and they had become law without further al
teration, the question of "original source" would have been ren
dered moot. 243 Although another new series of amendments was
proposed in the House and Senate by the original sponsors of the
239. Id.
240. Compare the language of § 3730(d)(I), supra note 237, with
§ 3730(e)(4)(A)'s description of public disclosure of "allegations or transactions in a
criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional administrative or Govern
ment Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news me
dia ...." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988).
241. United States ex reL Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d
CiT. 1991). See supra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.
242. Prudential, 944 F.2d at 1162-76 (Scirica, J., dissenting). Judge Scirica, in a
dissent that is actually longer than the majority opinion, completely retraces the legisla
tive history of the False Claims Act. Id.
243. See supra notes 72-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1992
and 1993 amendments to the Act.
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1986 amendments,244 to date the only bill that has actually been
passed by Congress is House Bill 4563; the only committee report
that has been issued is the Report from the House Committee on
the Judiciary which accompanied House Bill 4563; no other bills
have been passed and no other committee reports issued. 245 An
important question remains: do House Bill 4563 and its accompany
ing committee report have any significance in the interpretation of
section 3730(e)(4)?
The role of subsequent legislative histOry in statutory construc
tion has been subject to considerable debate. 246 Notwithstanding
the circuits' ability to find support in the legislative history of the
Act for a variety of interpretations, Congress' fundamental purpose
in the 1986 amendments was to encourage qui tam suits that were
not parasitic in nature. 247 Accepting this purpose, however, the
problem for the courts is to determine exactly what constitutes a
"parasitic suit." In their application of the jurisdictional bar, the
LILCO and Wang courts have gone too far, barring suits in cases
where the government has not filed suit and otherwise would not
have recovered any damages. 248 Inasmuch as contemporaneous
legislative history has proven as ambiguous as the language of the
statute itself,249 this is one of the rare instances in which judicious
use of subsequent legislative history may be useful in statutory con
struction. 250 Although congressional debate is not an appropriate
or reliable guide to the meaning of a statute, statements by commit
tee chairmen or the legislative sponsors or authors may be entitled
to some weight.251 Further, subsequent legislation on the same
topic may be persuasive, as will.l;ommittee reports issued within
244. See supra note 85-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1993
amendments.
245. Search of LEXIS, Legis Library, Billtext File, 101-104 (Feb. 17, 1995). See
also Mintz, supra note 84, at B11.
246. Araujo, supra note 178, at 125 & n.271.
247. See Kaner, supra note 40, at 294.
248. See Wang ex rei. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992);
United States ex rei. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1990); see
also, Kaner, supra note 40, at 294-95; Vogel, supra note 104, at 604; Oparil, supra note
54, at 549.
249. See United States ex rei. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154
(3d Cir. 1991).
250. See supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the value
and use of subsequent legislative history.
.
251. United States ex reL Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc., 19 F.3d 562
(11th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. St. Paul M. & M. R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 310, 318
(1918); S & E. Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 12-15 & n.9 (1972}). See
also Araujo, supra note 178, at 131 (citing Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43
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five years by the same committee that originally reported on the
previous legislation. 252
A review of Congress' post-enactment activity regarding the
False Claims Act thus proves useful in evaluating the weight to be
accorded the portion of the Act's legislative history. The House
Committee on the Judiciary was responsible for the committee re
ports that accompanied both House Bill 4827 in 1986 and House
Bill 4653 in 1992.253 The sponsor of the 1992 amendments in the
House was Representative Berman, the same individual who, to
gether with Senator Grassley, was responsible for shepherding the
1986 amendments through Congress.254 Although the 1992 House
Committee Report on House Bill 4563 misses the recommended
five year period by a few months, a court which was seeking gui
dance on the true congressional intent of section 3730(e)(4) could
find additional clarification in the language of the 1992 Amend
ments and their accompanying report. 255 Thus, the nature and
quality of the post-enactment legislative activity is such that it may
be accorded some weight in construing the statute.256
The clear language of these amendments and the unambiguous
interpretation of section 3730(e)(4) in the committee report fully
support the conclusion that a qui tam plaintiff can bring suit under
the False Claims Act even where she was not a source to the entity
that publicly disclosed the allegations on which her suit is based.257
The committee report for the 1992 amendments pointed specifically
to the need to clarify the language of the jurisdictional bar because
of various courts' incorrect interpretations, specifically citing what
it termed to be the flawed decision of the Second Circuit in
LILCO.258 As a result, the language of the 1992 amendments
HARV. L. REv. 863, 888-89 (1930» & 140 (citing JACK DAVIES, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS at § 15-1 (1986».
252. See supra note 205.
253. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, Vol. 2, § 11; H.R. REp. No. 837, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess, 1 (1992).
254. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, Vol. 2, § 25 at H6482; H.R. REp. No.
837, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1992).
255. See supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of
subsequent legislative history in statutory construction.
256. See supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
weight to be accorded post-enactment legislative history.
257. See H.R. 4563, 102d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1992); H.R. REp. No. 837, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 14 (1992); United States ex rei. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339,
1351-52 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994).
258. H.R. REp. No. 837, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 12, 14 (1992) (quoting United States
ex reL Dick V. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1990». See supra part
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would have allowed a qui tam plaintiff to bring a suit as long as
some part of her information did not come from a public disclo
sure. 259 Thus, the post-enactment legislative history of the False
Claims Act is both useful and compelling evidence that the true
congressional intent was not to require the relator to be a "whistle
blower," as mandated by the courts in LILCO and Wang.
Further, although House Bill 2915 and Senate Bill 841 were
not passed by the 103d Congress, the congressional hearings on
Senate Bill 841 afforded the sponsors of the original 1986 amend
ments the opportunity to address the jurisdictional bar and offer
clarifying interpretations of the original intent of Congress.2OO
Thus, the 1992 amendments, their accompanying committee report,
and the comments of Senator Grassley and Representative Berman
in the hearings on the 1993 amendments provide some additional
support for the Fourth Circuit's holding in Siller.261 Nonetheless, it
must be remembered that Congress has, in fact, passed no new leg
islation concerning the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act
since the 1986 amendments.262 As a result, a reliance on the pro
posed amendments as anything more than subtle support for the
conclusion in the Siller court would be unwise. Despite what seems
to be clear post-enactment evidence of congressional intent and
purpose, the Court's return to textualism and Justice Scalia's re
peated resistance to legislative history in any form suggest that the
use of post-enactment legislative history is probably ill-advised.263
Thus far, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to grant certi
orari to review any federal court decisions interpreting the "original
source" provision of section 3730(e)(4).264 In the Supreme Court's
I.A.5 for a discussion of the specific language of the 1992 amendments and the accom
panying committee reports.
259. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988). H.R. 4563, l02d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). See supra
note 74 for the complete text of the proposed amendment.
260. See 1993 Hearing, supra note 90. See also supra notes 90-94 and accompany
ing text.
261. See supra notes 199-205 for a discussion of the use of subsequent legislative
history in statutory construction.
262. Search of LEXIS, Legis Library, Billtext file, 101-104 (Feb. 17, 1995).
263. See generally, Scalia, supra' note 183.
264. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in five cases dealing with the juris
dictional bar in § 3730(e)(4). The Court has denied certiorari both in cases where the
court found that the standard for "original source" was "direct and independent plus"
and in cases where the court did not require the qui tam plaintiff to be the original
source to the disclosing entity. See United States ex rei. Siller v. Becton Dickinson &
Co., 21 F.3d 1339 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. a. 316 (1994) ("original source" satis
fied by direct and independent knowledge); United States ex reL Barajas v. Northrop
Corp., 5 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. a. 1543 (1994) ("original source
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holding in United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, the Court sent a
clear message to Congress that it would not correct the problems
inherent in the statute.265 No such clear direction can be inferred
from the Court's repeated denial of certiorari; nonetheless, the
challenge of unifying the federal courts' interpretation of the "origi
nal source" provision of the False Claims Act rests squarely on the
shoulders of Congress.
CONCLUSION

The fundamental precept behind the passage of the original
False Claims Act in 1863 was to enlist the aid of private citizens in
exposing fraud committed against the federal government by un
scrupulous contractors. While successive amendments to the Act
attempted to limit the ability of private plaintiffs to capitalize on
information concerning such fraud already in the public domain,
the original purpose of the Act nonetheless remains intact: the fed
eral government needs the assistance of private individuals in order
to curtail fraud and recover stolen funds.
The irreconcilable split among the various circuits over the
proper interpretation of the "original source" provision contained
in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) is a reflection of the confusion this clause
has engendered since its enactment. Of the rationales offered by
the various courts of appeals that have considered the "original
source" provision of 31 U.S.c. § 3730(e)(4), the Fourth Circuit's
holding in United States ex rei. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co. is
most faithful to the proper methodology of statutory construction.
Specifically, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the "original
source" provision allows suits by private plaintiffs to go forward,
effecting the primary purposes of the act, deterrence and recovery.
As interpreted by the Fourth Circuit, the requirement that the
plus"); United States ex rei. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548 (10th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. O. 1364 (1993) ("original source" satisfied by direct and in
dependent knowledge); United States ex reL Houck v. Folding Carton Admin. Comm.,
881 F.2d 494, 505 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026, and cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027
(1990) ("original source" satisfied by direct and independent knowledge).
265. See Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). U[T]he trouble with these argu
ments [to deny jurisdiction] is that they are addressed to the wrong forum. Conditions
may have changed, but the statute has not." Id. at 547. See also supra note 30 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's direction to Congress in its decision in
Hess. Congress was also directed to rewrite the legislation by the Seventh Circuit in its
decision in United States ex reL Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984). "If
the State of Wisconsin desires a special exemption to the False Claims Act ... then it
should ask Congress to provide the exemption." Id. at 1106.
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plaintiff have "direct and independent" knowledge of any publicly
disclosed allegations upon which her suit is based is sufficient to
protect against suits that are parasitic in nature without the extra
textual requirement that the "original source" have been the "whis
tle-blower," an interpretation that would prevent many worthwhile
qui tam suits from going forward.
The United States Courts of Appeals should therefore be
guided in their analysis of the "original source" provision of section
3730(e)(4) by the Fourth Circuit's holding in Siller. The Fourth Cir
cuit's decision utilizes fundamental statutory construction to ana
lyze the plain language of the statute and supports its analysis with
a judicious use of authoritative legislative history. After carefully
reviewing the statute, contemporaneous legislative history, and rel
evant case law, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a qui tam plaintiff
may maintain her suit under the False Claims Act as long as she has
direct and independent knowledge of the information upon which
her claims are based and voluntarily provides that information to
the government before filing her claim.
The conclusion that a straightforward application of the "direct
and independent" standard is sufficient to determine whether a re
lator can qualify as an "original source" is further supported by the
provision in the section of the statute that immediately precedes
section 3730(e)(4), "Award to Qui Tam Plaintiff," which does not
mention the "whistle-blower" requirement imposed by the courts in
LILCO and Wang. Additional support for this conclusion is found
in the passage by the House of amendments to the Act in 1992. The
1992 amendments indicate that the original intent of Congress in
the 1986 amendments to the Act is accurately reflected in the hold
ing of the four circuits - the Fourth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits266 - which have ruled on the jurisdictional bar since the
Ninth and Second Circuits established the "direct and independent
plus" standard. 267
To insure clarity and uniformity in the interpretation of section
266. See Cooper ex reL United States v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc., 19 F.3d
562 (11th Cir. 1994); United States ex reL Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d
1339 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994); United States ex reI. Springfield
Terminal Ry. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States ex reI. Precision Co.
v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1992), cert.denied, 113 S. Ct. 1364 (1993).
267. Although Congress' proposal of the 1993 amendments to the Act cannot be
accorded significant weight as no legislation was passed, the statements of Sen. Grassley
and Rep. Berman in hearings on the proposed amendments interpreting the original
intent of the 1986 Amendments, also provide support the conclusion reached by the
Fourth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. See 1993 Hearings, supra note 90, at 3 & 6.
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3730(e)(4), Congress should pass amendments to the Act such as
those originally proposed in the 102d and 103d Congress. Such leg
islation would discredit the contrary reasoning of the Second and
Ninth Circuits and would result in unanimity on this significant is
sue among the courts of appeals. The demonstrated impact of the
False Claims Act on the public fisc since the passage of the 1986
amendments - over a half billion dollars between the enactment of
the amendments and the first quarter of 1994 alone - reinforces
the need for consistency among the federal courts. A narrow read
ing of the jurisdictional bar in section 3730(e)(4) will result in addi
tional identification of fraudulent activities against the government
and increased awards, which will both supplement the federal treas
ury and act as a deterrent to unscrupulous contractors and suppli
ers. Thus, the "Lincoln Law" will fulfill its original promise, and
Congress will finally reach a reasoned and reasonable compromise
between opportunity and opportunism.
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